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Abstract:  We conduct a basic yet thorough analysis of entry and exit in the US broadband 
market, using a complete FCC census of providers from 2005 to 2008.  There is a tremendous 
amount of (simultaneous) entry and exit in the US broadband market.  Most entry is from 
existing providers expanding into new geographic areas.  Entry and exit vary widely across the 
various modes of provision, which argues against treating broadband as a homogenous service 
in theoretical or empirical work.  The highest entry rates also generally have the highest entrant 
shares.  Entry rates display positive autocorrelation, and the same is true for exit.  There is also 
positive correlation between the entry and exit rates at various leads and lags, suggesting that 
there are systematic differences among the broadband types in the height of entry and exit 
barriers.  We discuss some implications these results may have for both policy purposes and 
future work in the broadband market. 
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I. Introduction 
The importance of broadband to modern life as consumers, citizens, students, 
producers of goods and services, and providers of public safety is well established.  The entire 
edifice of the market for broadband rests on the foundation of its infrastructure. Since demand 
for broadband service cannot be satisfied and the enjoyment of the benefits of broadband 
usage cannot begin until supply is available, it is critical to monitor and explore the evolution of 
the market on the supply side.  The broadband market is also of particular interest given the 
importance of broadband for local economic development, labor productivity, and GDP growth 
(Gillett et al., 2006; Kolko, 2010; Greenstein and McDevitt, 2009; Prieger, forthcoming).  
Broadband markets are also a potentially fertile laboratory for the economist to develop and 
test theories about market dynamics.   
Despite the importance of the broadband market, however, little work has been done 
on the dynamics of the market. Most studies of entry in the market for broadband service 
provision are static in nature.  In a typical such study, a cross-section of either the number of 
broadband firms or an indicator for the presence of at least one firm in the local area is 
regressed on various market and demographic characteristics  (Prieger, 2003; Grubesic and 
Murray, 2004; Flamm, 2005, Prieger and Church, 2012).  These studies of broadband availability 
in the US show that firms’ decisions to deploy network resources and offer service in a local area 
depend on economic and regulatory considerations.  Demand factors such as the size of the 
local market, average income in the area, and other demographic characteristics such as the 
education and age profile of the area have all been shown to affect broadband penetration 
(Prieger, 2003; Grubesic and Murray, 2004; Flamm, 2005; Flamm and Chaudhuri, 2007; Prieger 
and Hu, 2008b).1  Some of these studies also show that variables that are proxies for cost 
factors, such as population density, terrain, etc., also influence broadband penetration in the 
expected ways.  Due to low population density and generally rougher topography than urban 
areas, rural areas are less likely to have broadband available at all, or more likely to be served 
only with lower-speed broadband or by few providers (Stenberg et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011; 
Prieger, forthcoming).  Intramodal and intermodal competition among providers, both actual 
and potential, also affects the incentives to enter the local broadband markets (Denni and 
Gruber, 2007; Prieger and Hu, 2008a; Wallsten and Mallahan, 2010).  Regulatory policy that 
alters the expected return on broadband network investment, such as mandated unbundling of 
                                                          
1
 See also the review of broadband demand studies in Hauge and Prieger (2010). 
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network elements for use by competitors, can also impact the deployment decision by (Prieger 
and Lee, 2008).  Almost all these results have been gleaned from cross-sectional, static studies 
of current market participants. 
This paper examines the FCC’s data on where broadband service was offered from June 
2005 to June 2008. By linking broadband service providers’ data submissions over time, we are 
able to measure and investigate the sources and determinants of entry and exit in the US 
broadband market. We define markets four ways for purposes of study:  the geographical extent 
of the market is either the nation or a ZIP code area, and the product market extent is either a 
single broadband type or all types.     
Instead of jumping directly to regressions or structural modeling of the industry, we 
instead conduct a more basic empirical investigation of entry and exit in this paper.  In the terms 
of Geroski (1995), our aim is to set out “stylized facts” coming from basic descriptions of the 
data, instead of stylized (or specific) results from regressions.  In taking this approach, we apply 
the lessons from recent decades in the IO literature that establishing basic descriptive facts 
about industry entry and exit can motivate better theoretical and empirical modeling.  As an 
example, Einav and Levin (2010) cite the findings of Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) 
(hereafter denoted DRS) and others that there is a great deal of heterogeneity between firms’ 
entry and exit patterns.  DRS’s findings motivated a wave of new theoretical and empirical 
models of industry dynamics including firm heterogeneity, simultaneous entry and exit, and 
other “real world” features (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericson and Pakes 1995).  
These models were better able to account for the stylized facts the literature had accumulated, 
including that a great deal of exit can coexist with entry, and that entry and exit rates are highly 
correlated across industries (Geroski, 1995), so that industry-specific factors appear to be 
important in explaining market dynamics.  
Toward the goal of building a set of basic facts about market dynamics in broadband 
markets, we address several questions in this paper.  How do the market dynamics compare 
with what is known about other markets?  How much entry in the local markets comes from 
truly new entrants, and how much is from expansion of existing firms?  Are there substantial 
differences in entry and exit across geographic and product-type markets?  And finally, how 
much turnover of firms is there?  We close this section with a preview of our findings regarding 
these questions. 
First, how do entry and exit in the broadband market compare with that in other 
markets?  The striking conclusion is that there is a tremendous amount of dynamic activity in 
the US broadband market.  In the national market, the entry rate averages 14-19% annually, 
which is greater than the entry rates the economic literature has found for many other 
industries.  The exit rate for broadband is also higher than for other industries, but not as high as 
the entry rate, so that net entry averages 3.1% annually.  With narrower geographic or service 
type market definitions, the entry rates average from 24% to an astounding 49% per annum.  
Thus, the dynamic element in the market is huge. 
The second question, whence comes entry, has policy relevance to questions regarding 
competition and mergers in the telecommunications and broadband industry.  While the FCC 
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pays great attention to potential dominance by large providers at the national level (e.g., their 
denial of the recently proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger), what matters for consumers is the 
number of options available where they live. 2  We demonstrate that at least three in four 
entrants at the ZIP code level expand geographically into the area.  When the local markets are 
delineated by service type, another one in every five entrants is a firm already operating in the 
area that diversifies its product mix by offering another type of broadband access.  These 
entrants are also much larger than de novo entrants on average.  Thus, most entry and much of 
the dynamism in the market, along with the new options that entry provides for consumers, 
comes from large, existing firms. 
The third question of heterogeneity in dynamics among areas and broadband service 
types also has policy relevance.  Since the main form of competition in broadband markets at 
the time was between the incumbent DSL provider and the local franchise cable company 
offering cable modem service, it is important to understand how the dynamics among those 
types of firms may differ.  We show that average entry and exit rates mask much variation 
among different types of broadband service; entry is much more prominent in some broadband 
types than others.  In particular, in the local markets there is five times as much entry in the DSL 
than in the cable modem markets.  There is also great variation in exit rates.  Thus, analyses that 
lump together all broadband types in a market, as most of the previous work cited above had to 
do, may miss much interesting variation and strategic interaction via intermodal competition. 
The final question of turnover of firms in the marketplace impinges directly on previous 
work done in this area.  Only one paper of which we are aware has attempted directly to 
address dynamics in the broadband marketplace.  Xiao and Orazem (2011) extend Bresnahan 
and Reiss’s (1991, 1994) model of local oligopoly to allow firms to enter and exit the ZIP code-
level markets.  Their work makes creative use of the publicly available data from the FCC, which 
(at the time) consists only of counts of firms offering service in the ZIP code, undifferentiated by 
type.  The data do not reveal the identities of market participants, and so true longitudinal data 
on the firms in the local markets is unavailable.  They find that once the market has one to three 
firms, the fourth and succeeding entrants have little effect on competitive conduct, which they 
infer from their findings regarding the role of sunk costs in determining entry conditions.  A key 
assumption, which the authors are forced to hold out of necessity given the available data, is 
that there is no simultaneous entry and exit.  In other words, when net entry is zero in a 
market/period, it is assumed that there is no churn.  Our investigation here shows this 
assumption is untenable.  In fact, using the same FCC data (but for our later time period, 2005-
2008), we find that in ZIP codes with no net entry in a period, a full 41.2% of the time there was 
simultaneous entry and exit (i.e. within the prior six months). 3  
In the next section, we describe the FCC data and our measures of entry and exit.  In 
section III, we present results for entry and exit rates, in the form of averages, variation across 
                                                          
2
 And, in the case of mobile broadband, where they travel.  
3
 For comparability with Xiao and Orazem (2005), we group different service types within the ZIP code for 
this calculation. 
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types of broadband, autocorrelation, and correlation with each other.  A concluding section 
gathers the results into a set of stylized facts for the industry. 
II. Measuring the Entry and Exit Broadband Providers  
A. Data Construction 
1. Broadband provider data 
The FCC has collected data from providers of end-user broadband service since 1999.  
Broadband providers complete the semi-annual Form 477, which until 2009 required them to 
list each five-digit ZIP code in which they provide service.4  The firms provide separate ZIP code 
lists for each type of broadband service offered.  During the period June 2005 to June 2008, the 
years we study here,5 the broadband types were categorized as asymmetric DSL (ADSL), 
broadband over power line (BPL), cable modem, fiber, satellite, fixed terrestrial wireless (also 
known as wireless Internet service providers, WISPs), mobile terrestrial wireless, symmetric DSL 
(SDSL), and a residual “other” category.6  The lists do not include information on the number of 
subscribers served within the ZIP code area. 
Given our interest in marketplace dynamics—the entry and exit of broadband 
providers—we linked firms’ Form 477 filings over time.7  Thus, a major task in the project was to 
link firms’ filings over time, accounting for variation in company names, mergers, acquisitions, 
spin-offs, cable system area swaps and other asset sales and transfers, and other phenomena 
affecting matching. 8  
After creating a common set of identification codes for the broadband providers, we set 
out to account for as many mergers and other forms of corporate reorganization as feasible.  
                                                          
4
 In 2009, the providers began reporting local service at the Census tract level. 
5
 The FCC provided the Form 477 data to the authors under a confidentiality agreement.   
6
  The “other” category in the FCC ZIP code lists includes traditional wireless services such as T1 (1.544 
Mbit/s) and T3 (44.736 Mbit/s) dedicated lines (non-fiber high-capacity digital lines, also known as DS-1 
and DS-3). For reasons of consistent data quality that we describe below, we drop the “other” category 
from our empirical investigation. 
7
 Due to some violations we found of the FCC’s rule that providers should file one form combining the 
information for all service companies in a state under the same holding company, our final count of 
providers differs a bit from the official FCC reports. 
8
 Within each round, we examined the lists of firms that disappeared from many ZIP codes to determine if 
a merger, name change, or major sales of assets explained the apparent exit.  Similarly, we examined the 
lists of firms that newly appeared in many ZIP codes to determine if a name change or major purchase of 
assets explained the apparent entry.  We collected information on as many mergers, etc., as we could find 
from newspapers, the trade press, SEC filings, and Internet sources.  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that we likely missed some corporate reorganizations and (particularly) asset sales among smaller firms. 
8 
Within each round, we examined the lists of firms that disappeared from many (or all) ZIP codes 
to determine if a merger, name change, or major sales of assets explained the apparent exit.  
Similarly, we examined the lists of firms that newly showed up in many ZIP codes to determine if 
a name change or major purchase of assets explained the apparent entry.  We collected 
information on as many mergers, etc., as we could find.  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that we undoubtedly missed some corporate reorganizations and (particularly) asset sales. To 
the extent that we missed some forms of corporate reorganization, our measures of entry and 
exit may be overstated. 
We now explain how we treat entry and exit due to mergers and other reorganizations.  
Our aim was to adhere to existing practice in the academic literature on empirical studies of firm 
dynamics, most particularly DRS.9  First, straightforward asset sales and swaps are not treated as 
exit of the old owner followed by entry of the new owner, whenever we had information on the 
transactions.  For example, as part of the Adelphia acquisition that was effective in August 2006, 
Comcast and Time Warner swapped system ownership in various areas.  Any apparent exit of 
Comcast in a market followed by subsequent apparent entry of Time Warner (or vice versa) was 
thus not treated as actual exit or entry.  We note (again) that we undoubtedly missed some 
asset transfers among firms, leading to overstated measures of turnover within some markets. 
For mergers and acquisitions, when the two merging firms already compete in the same 
market, we treat the combination of the firms in the market as resulting in one continuing firm 
and one exit.10  (As we explain below in section B.1, we consider various definitions of market in 
the study.) When the acquired firm offered service in a market in one period and the new entity 
appears in the market in the next period after the merger, we treat it as a continuing firm. 
For reverse mergers and corporate spin-offs, when the involved parties go from one 
firm to two firms within a market, we treat only one of the firms as entering the market.  For 
example, consider the case when ALLTEL spun off its wired broadband service business as 
Windstream in 2006.  If ALLTEL was in a market before the spinoff, and both ALLTEL and 
Windstream are in the same market after, then Windstream alone is counted as an entrant. On 
the other hand, if ALLTEL is in a market before the spinoff but only Windstream is in the same 
market afterward, then Windstream is treated as a continuing firm.11   
                                                          
9
 DRS, the seminal empirical study of firm entry and exit in the modern industrial organization literature, 
study entry and exit in the manufacturing sector of the US economy during the years 1963-1982. 
10
 The decision of which firm we treat as the exiting company matters in some of the measures of exit we 
consider below (namely, the measures of exiters’ market share and relative size).  In the case of 
acquisitions, we treat the acquired firm as the exiter.  For mergers, we judged which firm appeared to be 
the dominant partner in the merger (e.g., we treated SBC as the continuing firm and AT&T as the exiting 
firm in the SBC-AT&T merger, despite the fact that the new firm kept the AT&T moniker).  In one case, 
three firms merged (Choice One Communications, CTC Communications, and Conversent Communications 
merged to form One Communications Corp. in July 2006), and so in markets where all three competed, 
two were marked as exiting. 
11
 For the few unwindings of 50-50 partnerships we found (e.g., the Comcast-Insight Communications 
Company partnership unwinding in 2007), we treat any name change in a market (e.g., an Insight system 
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2. ZIP code data 
The second issue involved with creating a dynamic picture of the market is that the 
universe of ZIP codes changes over time.  The US Postal Service constantly creates new codes 
and removes obsolete codes from use.  Since ZIP code areas change over time, we use ZIP Code 
Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) defined for the 2000 Census for our geographical market boundaries.  
We mapped the reported ZIP codes in the FCC data each year to the (stable) ZCTA’s.12 Despite 
our actual use of ZCTA’s, we will continue to refer to “ZIP code areas” below. 
3. Limitations of the data 
There are several limitations in the data, some of which are common to all studies of 
entry and exit.  The primary task in creating any panel dataset of market participants is the 
linking the firms over time, which can be difficult due to name and ownership changes.  In the 
Form 477 data, we linked holding companies over time by name as we described above in 
section A.  While we cannot guarantee that we properly connected all variants of the firms’ 
names correctly over rounds, we spent much time on this task and attempted to investigate all 
occurrences of possibly related names.  This task was no more difficult with the Form 477 data 
than it would have been for any other arbitrary set of firms.  However, the FCC data do not 
contain unique firm identifiers that are consistent over the years, as are available in typical US 
Census longitudinal datasets on firms and plants.   
Other limitations appear to be specific to (or at least exacerbated in) the Form 477 data.  
A major concern is that there is a great amount of apparent one-round entry and exit.  That is, 
there appears to be an inordinate number of firms that enter a ZIP code in one round but are 
missing again the next (“one-round entry”).  Similarly, there are many instances of firms that 
exit a ZIP code in one round, only to return in the next round (“one-round exit”).  In the ZIP-BB 
market, 20.4% of all entry is one-round entry.  Over half (52%) of these one-round entrants may 
have exited legitimately due to some sort of merger event, leaving about one-tenth of all entry 
as unexplained one-round entry.    A similar amount of all exit is one-round exit.  Taken at face 
value, these figures indicate a remarkably dynamic and contestable market,13 with firms perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Illinois changing to a Comcast system after the unwinding) as exit followed by entry, under the 
assumption that the holding company that filed the area in its Form 477 probably had the upper hand in 
its management under the partnership. 
12
 We mapped ZIP’s to ZCTA’s with the crosswalk files provided by The U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Resources (see Goodman (2005) for methodology).  By far the most common substantive change 
in USPS ZIP code areas is splitting a ZIP code into two areas, one of which will be designated with a new 
number.  In such cases both new areas are mapped back into the original ZCTA and combined in our 
methodology. 
13
 In a contestable market, the threat of hit-and-run entry leads to outcomes sharing certain properties 
(such as zero long-run profit) with competitive markets, even though industry structure is non-
competitive (for example, there is only a single firm actually supplying the market).  See W. Baumol, J. 
Panzar, and R. Willig (1982). 
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hopping in and out of the various local markets to take advantage of transient profit 
opportunities (what is sometimes called “hit-and-run entry” in the market contestability 
literature).14   
Upon closer examination, however, it seems nearly certain that the amount of entry and 
exit is exaggerated in these data.  Consider the various reasons for one-round exit, for instance: 
1. The firm did not offer the particular broadband type in the ZIP code that round, 
because the firm stopped offering the service in the ZIP code temporarily. 
2. The firm continued to offer service that round, but had no customers.  This situation is 
most likely to occur when only a small part of a ZIP code is covered in the service 
footprint of the broadband provider. 
3. The firm mistyped a ZIP code in Form 477 that round.  Not only does this create one-
round exit, it may also create (erroneous) one-round entry in the ZIP code that was 
erroneously entered (if the firm did not already offer service there).15  We found 
instances of obviously mistyped ZIP codes (e.g., those smaller than 00500 and those 
where the ZIP code does not match the state to which the firm’s Form 477 purportedly 
pertains.  We dropped the former but could not check for all the latter (and it appears 
that the FCC IATD may not have corrected for the latter, either).16 
4. The firm did not file Form 477 at all that round, even though it should have.  This 
appears to have happened with some smaller firms, although we cannot be sure the 
firm did not have a legitimate reason for not filing. 
5. The firm filed Form 477 that round, but we treated it as a different firm than in the 
rounds before and after because of an error linking the firms’ name variants over time.  
Given our extensive checking of the names, we expect errors of this type to be rare. 
Furthermore, if such errors exist, they will pertain to relatively small providers only, 
because we verified all instances of significant entry or exit (i.e., entry or exit occurring 
by the same firm in many markets). 
 
It is clear that only case 1 meets the definition of “exit” as the term is normally used in 
the industrial organization literature.  It is interesting to note that one-round entrants and 
exiters appear to be very small.  Whereas the average entrant or exiter in the ZIP-BB market is 
much larger than incumbents and remaining firms (as we describe in section below), one-round 
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 See sections 10.3 and 10.4 of Train (1991). 
15
 Consequently, positive correlation would be induced between one-round entry and exit within a round.  
The correlation in the sample between these two measures is indeed positive (around 0.3), but is not 
statistically significant due to the small number of round from which the correlation is calculated. 
16
 We checked a few ZIP codes with obviously mistyped numbers and looked at how the raw data 
compare to the final (publicly available) count of providers in the ZIP code.  Take the hypothetical example 
of ZIP code 97222 showing up in a Form 477 ostensibly for Virginia.  It appears that the official FCC count 
of broadband providers includes such entries in the count for 97222 (which also means that the Virginia 
count would be artificially small). 
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entrants are only one-quarter the size of incumbents on average, and one-round exiters are 12% 
smaller than surviving firms.17   
A second idiosyncratic feature of our data has to do with the “other” broadband 
category.  We drop the “other” category from the dataset for the analysis, due to apparently 
incomplete data in some rounds.  In the rounds analyzed, there are about 250 firms offering 
broadband service of type “other” in rounds 12-13 and 17-18, but only about 75 in the 
intervening rounds 14-16.18  Clearly, this is an artifact of the data at our disposal, but we were 
not able to discern what caused the apparent error in the counts.  Because of the inconsistency 
in the count of providers of “other” broadband, and also because the category may be the least 
interesting of itself (unless one’s interest is in the business market for T1 lines), we deleted all 
appearances of this category within each ZIP code.19 
 
B. Entry and Exit Measures 
We analyze several measures of entry and exit in the market for broadband provision.  
To allow comparison and to follow best practice in the academic literature on market dynamics, 
we define our measures as in DRS.  We analyze gross entry and exit (i.e., counts of entering and 
exiting firms separately) rather than net entry (i.e., the net change in the number of firms in a 
market, where net exit is counted as negative net entry).  The economic literature on market 
dynamics (such as DRS) points out that gross measures are appropriate to examine industry 
dynamics, since gross entry and exit may be high even when net entry is low.20   
1. Market definition 
To begin with, the market must be defined, since entry and exit must be quantified with 
reference to a precisely defined market.  From the household’s perspective, the market consists 
of all broadband providers able to serve the household’s location. Thus, the geographic extent 
of the market in this perspective is no larger than the walls of the house.  The same is true for 
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 We cannot infer whether the apparent entry and exit is spurious directly from the fact that the 
suspicious one-round entrants and exiters are small.  Small firms may potentially be more prone to make 
mistakes in filling out the ZIP code lists, but (since they have fewer customers) they are also more likely to 
be susceptible to case 2. 
18
 In particular, our count of unique holding companies offering service of type “other” is:  June 2005 
(round 12)—238; Dec. 2005 (round 13)—243; June 2006 (round 14)—74; Dec. 2006 (round 15)—77; June 
2007 (round 16)—73; Dec. 2007 (round 17)—241; June 2008 (round 18)—246.    
19
 If the “other” category is left in the data, then (as one would expect) the exit rates are spuriously 
skewed upward in round 14 and the entry rates are spuriously skewed upward in round 17. 
20
 It is worth noting that with the publicly available Form 477 data, in which company identities are not 
revealed, only net entry can be studied (as in Xiao and Orazem (2005).  Even then, not all net entry is 
observable, given that the FCC censors the publicly available data when one to three providers are in the 
ZIP code. 
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business subscribers. Using the logic of the familiar SSNIP test from antitrust law and 
economics,21 for example, one can see that the prices offered to households adjacent to our 
original “market of one” household are irrelevant in the original household’s demand decision.  
Thus, starting with a market of one household, the SSNIP test never increases the size of the 
market.  That is, the household can never “go next door” to buy broadband service at a better 
price. 22   In the product space, however, different modes of broadband provision are 
substitutable to some degree.  Thus, it may make sense to put cable modem service in same 
market as DSL, even though they are not perfectly substitutable, as argued by Cardona et al. 
(2009).  It may make less sense to put mobile wireless broadband in the same market as DSL, 
given that DSL service does not “travel” with the user. 23  Nonetheless, in some parts of the 
world DSL and mobile broadband have been found to be close substitutes (Vogelsang, 2010; 
Srinuan, Srinuan, and Bohlin, 2012).  In other areas fixed and mobile broadband may be 
complements, at least in the nascence of mobile broadband service (Lee, Marcu, and Lee, 2011). 
Some economists argue that the mechanical application of traditional antitrust 
definitions such as SSNIP to technologically dynamic settings results in markets that are 
inappropriately small (Pleatsikas and Teece, 2001).24  In the geographical dimension of the 
market, we do not have household-level data to work with anyway.  It also may be 
inappropriate to think of market definition in purely antitrust terms.  On the supply side, a 
broadband provider clearly does not enter a market household by household, due to the 
economies of scale that make it economic to begin offering service with a footprint covering 
many households or businesses.  At the small end of the geographical entry decision may be 
fiber, where entry into the broadband market may mean deploying the optical carrier 
infrastructure to serve a small group of office buildings in a dense urban center.  At the other 
end of the geographic spectrum are the satellite firms, who upon enter can serve any location in 
the US with a clear view of the southern sky.  The relevant geographic markets on the supply 
side for DSL, cable modem service, and wireless services fall between these extremes. 
In the end, our choice of market definition is driven by what is available in the Form 477 
data.  In this initial work, we present results for three markets that are feasible to define with 
                                                          
21
 “A Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test asks whether a hypothetical 
monopolist could profitably impose a small increase in price. If sufficient numbers of buyers would switch 
to alternative products or to suppliers at other locations such that the price increase is unprofitable, then 
the market definition must be expanded to include at least some of those substitute products or 
locations” (Connolly and Prieger, 2009). 
22
 We recognize this statement is subject to falsification by reductio ad absurdum.  Clearly if the price of 
broadband service were $1000 in Household A and $10 in neighboring Household B, there would be ways 
for the households to mutually benefit from “trade,” (for example, through Household A piggybacking off 
the wireless home network of Household B). 
23
 For a discussion of how traditional market definition may proceed for the broadband industry, see U.S. 
Department of Justice, Ex Parte Comments in the Matter of Economic Issues in Broadband Competition: A 
National Broadband Plan for Our Future  (GN Docket No. 09-51), section III.A, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/253393.htm (accessed November 19, 2010). 
24
 See also the discussion of the issue of market definition in Connolly and Prieger (2009), section 2.4.1.  
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the data at hand.  The largest market we examine, the US market, is the entire US (the 50 states 
plus Washington, DC)25 and includes all forms of broadband without differentiation.  The 
smallest market we investigate has the geographic extent of a ZIP code area and is restricted to 
a single type of broadband in product space.  We call this market ZIP-BB, since markets are 
distinguished by ZIP code and type of broadband.  Widening the geographic extent of the 
market to the nation but still differentiating among broadband types gives us the US-BB market.  
While there is only one market per round with the US definition, there are eight markets per 
round with the US-BB definition (one each for ADSL, BPL, cable modem, fiber, satellite, fixed 
terrestrial wireless, mobile terrestrial wireless, and SDSL). The ZIP-BB definition leads to 253,648 
markets per round (31,706 ZCTA areas times eight service types). 
2. Measures of entry 
We use the following notation to measure the amount and scale of entry:26 
 NTi(t) = total number of firms; the count of broadband providers present in market i 
(however defined) in period t.  All firms under the same holding company 
count as a single firm. 
 NEi(t) = number of entrants; the count of broadband providers that enter market i in 
period t.  In particular, the count of providers present in the Form 477 data 
in period t that were not present in the Form 477 data from period t-1. 
 QTi
k(t) = quantity produced by a firm; the number of broadband lines that provider k 
(one of those present in market i) serves in period t.  For market ZIP-BB, 
only lines of the same type of broadband service are counted.  For the ZIP 
level markets, the line counts are those for the state level and thus are only 
a proxy for ZIP level quantities. 
 QTi(t) = total quantity produced; the sum of the number of lines served in period t 
by each of the broadband providers present in market i in period t:  QTi(t) = 
kQTi
k(t).   
                                                          
25
 Although the FCC data includes Puerto Rico, we exclude those observations from our study. 
26
 This section and the next follow DRS closely. 
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 QEi
k(t) = quantity produced of an entrant; the number of lines broadband provider k 
(one of the entrants in market i) serves in period t; constructed as for 
QTi
k(t). 
 QEi(t) = total quantity produced by entrants;  the sum of the number of lines served 
in period t by each of the broadband entrants present in market i in period 
t:  QEi(t) = kQEi
k(t). 
Using these definitions, the entry rate ER in market i in period t is: 
ERi(t) = NEi(t)/NTi(t-1) 
Following the convention of DRS and other authors, the denominator is the number of 
firms present in the previous period.  In the absence of exit, ERi(t) is thus the percentage 
increase in the number of firms between periods t and t-1.  Note that the entry rate is undefined 
for previously “empty” markets, for which NTi(t-1) = 0.  This is problematic for new markets, 
where NEi(t) > 0 and NTi(t-1) = 0. For the ZIP-BB market definition, which (we will see) includes 
many instances of new markets, we may instead be interested in the alternative entry rate ERalt, 
defined as 
)(/)()( tNTtNEtER ii
alt
i   
which is the fraction of firms present in period t that are entrants.  Unlike ERi(t), 
)(tERalti  is defined for new markets.
27 
To examine how the size of entrants compares with that of existing providers in the 
market, we define ESH, the entrants’ share of the ZIP codes served by all the firms active in 
market i as 
ESHi(t) = QEi(t)/QTi(t) 
The interpretation for the national level markets is straightforward. However, care must 
be taken in interpreting ESHi(t) for the geographically delineated markets, for in such cases ESH 
is not the market share of output in market i that is produced by entrants.  Market share within 
the ZIP code is known since providers were not required to report lines by ZIP code (i.e., we 
have no measure of broadband subscribership at the ZIP code level).  Instead, for the ZIP 
markets ESHi(t) is the number of lines across the state served by the entrants in market i, 
                                                          
27
 Furthermore, ER
alt
 is bounded between 0 and 1, inclusive.  In markets that are growing, ER > ER
alt
. 
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expressed as the ratio to the sum of the number of lines in the state served by all firms in 
market i.28  Thus for the ZIP markets ESH measures the proportion of the state-level scale of 
firms in market i (which may not offer service everywhere in the state) due to entrants.  
We define the average size of entering firms (measured as the state-level scale of their 
operations, in the case of the ZIP markets) relative to that of incumbents, ERS, as  
)]()([)]()([
)()(
)(
tNEtNTtQEtQT
tNEtQE
tERS
iiii
ii
i

  
ERS allows us to compare the relative scale of entrants to incumbents at a point in time.  
In the denominator, the measures appropriate to the incumbents are calculated by removing 
the entrants’ measures from the totals.  ERS is undefined when there is no entry. 
3. Measures of exit 
Similarly, we measure exit using the following: 
 NXi(t) = number of exiting firms (“exiters”); count of the broadband providers that 
exit market i between periods t-1 and t.  In particular, NXi(t) is the count of 
providers present in the Form 477 data in period t-1 that were no longer 
present in the Form 477 data from period t. 
 QXi
k(t) = quantity produced by an exiter; the number of lines broadband served in 
period t-1 by broadband provider k (one of the providers exiting market i 
between periods t-1 and t); constructed as for QTi
k(t). 
 QXi(t) = the total quantity produced by exiters;  the sum of the number of lines 
served in period t-1 by each of the broadband firms exiting market i 
between periods t-1 and t:  QXi(t) = kQXi
k(t).  
Note the convention for the timing: an “exiter” in period t exited the market between 
periods t-1 and t, and the quantities associated with the exiters pertain to the last period in 
which they provided service.  Using these definitions, the exit rate XR in market i in period t is: 
XRi(t) = NXi(t)/NTi(t-1) 
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 Since the latter includes the former, ESH is bounded between 0 and 1, inclusive. 
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In the absence of entry, XRi(t) is thus the percentage decrease in the number of firms 
between periods t and t-1.  Note that the exit rate is undefined for empty markets (those for 
which NTi(t-1) = 0).   
To examine how the size of exiting firms compares with that of existing providers in the 
market, we define the exiters’ share (XSH) of the ZIP codes served by all the firms active in 
market i as 
XSHi(t) = QXi(t)/QTi(t-1)  
Similar to ESH, for the ZIP level markets XSHi(t) is the number of lines in the state served 
by the firms that exited market i just prior to period t, expressed as the ratio to the state-
aggregated line count for all firms in market i are present (also in period t-1).29  Thus, for the ZIP 
markets XSH measures the proportion of the state-level scale of firms in market i due to exiters.  
Finally, the average size of exiting firms (measured as the state-level scale of their 
operations, in the case of the ZIP markets) relative to that of incumbents, XRS, is:  
)]()1([)]()1([
)()(
)(
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XRS allows us to compare the scale of exiting firms relative to incumbents at a point in 
time.  In the denominator, the measures appropriate to the incumbents are calculated by 
removing the exiters’ measures from the totals.  XRS is undefined when there is no exit. 
4. Sources of entry and exit 
We also investigate from where entry arises in the ZIP-BB market. A de novo  entrant in 
period t is a firm appearing somewhere in the Form 477 data in period t but nowhere in the data 
in period t-1.  Such entry is also called “greenfield” entry in the literature).  De novo entrants are 
new firms (labeled NF in the following) that did not previously offer any type of broadband in 
the US.30  We assume that the new firm uses new infrastructure to provide service, which will be 
the case to the extent that we have properly accounted for asset sales.     
Entry can also occur through geographic expansion: the first appearance of the firm in 
the ZIP code with any broadband type.  In this case, the geographically expanding (GE) firm 
previously offered service in other ZIP codes. Although new ZIP codes may be served by existing 
telecommunications infrastructure in some cases, typically GE entry requires new plant.  Finally, 
a firm can enter through diversifying its product mix (labeled DF, for “diversifying firm”).  For 
example, a firm offering ADSL in period 15 in the ZIP area who expands its service offerings to 
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 Since the latter includes the former, ESH is bounded between 0 and 1, inclusive. 
30
 At least, they were not in the market in the previous period.  They may have served the market in 
period t-2 or earlier. 
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include SDSL in period 16 is counted as an entrant of type DF in the period 16 SDSL market in the 
same ZIP area. 
The nomenclature for exit is similar.  Exit of type EF (for “exiting firm”) means the 
disappearance of the firm from all markets.  Exit of type GC  (for “geographic contraction”) is the 
disappearance of the firm from the ZIP code, while continuing to serve customers elsewhere.   
CF exit, for  “consolidating firm,” means the firm stops offering one type of broadband while 
continuing to offer other modes in the geographic market.  In other words, exit of type CF 
means the consolidating firm is reducing its product mix. 
5. Adjustment to exclude single-round entry and exit 
One concern with taking the measures of entry and exit proposed above to the data is 
that there is a great amount of apparent one-round entry and exit in the ZIP market.  This 
feature of the data was discussed above in section II.A.3.  Using the ZIP-BB market, 20.3% of all 
entry is one-round entry.  About half (48%) of these one-round entrants may have legitimately 
exited due to some sort of merger event, leaving at least one-tenth of all entry as unexplained 
one-round entry.  There is similarly a nontrivial amount of one-round exit.   
To avoid overstating the amount of entry and exit in the raw data, we also calculate 
statistics for entry and exit excluding the one-rounders.  In the tables and discussion to follow, 
when one-round entry and exit remains in the data we call the statistic at issue “unadjusted.”  
When one-round entry and exit has been removed before calculating the statistic, we call the 
result “adjusted.”  To the extent that an unknown amount of one-round entry and exit is 
spurious, the adjusted and unadjusted figures will bracket the true level. 
III. Basic Analysis of Entry and Exit 
We now turn to the analysis of entry and exit in the market for broadband service 
provision.  Throughout this section we will compare our results with those of DRS and other 
studies of entry and exit (Koski and Sierimo, 2003; Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 2005; 
Lotti, 2007).  
We begin by examining the average levels of entry and exit in the broadband market, 
breaking each down into specific modes of entry and exit.  In subsection B, we consider how 
entry and exit rates are distributed within markets, to give a sense of how the industry dynamics 
vary both within and across markets.  In subsection C, we look at how the entry and exit rates 
are correlated with themselves and with each other, which sheds additional light on the 
dynamics of the broadband market.   
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A. Entry and Exit Rates 
a) Average entry and exit statistics 
We begin our description of entry and exit in the broadband market by measuring the 
average levels.  Unlike DRS, who drop the smallest firms from their analysis, we include all firms 
in our calculations.31    
For the national broadband market including all types of broadband (the US market), 
the entry and exit rates measure the turnover in firms that show up at least once in the Form 
477 data.  The figures are given in Table 1.  The first fact that is apparent is the great amount of 
entry and exit that occurs.  The semi-annual entry rate varies from 5.6% (June 2008) to 15.2% 
(December 2005), and has an annualized average rate of 19.2%.  Even the adjusted rates (Table 
2) are high, varying from 4.6% to 11.6%, yielding a 13.6% annualized average entry rate.  Entry is 
thus higher than many yearly entry rates found in the literature, for example a 9.8% entry rate 
for manufacturing firms from DRS 32 or 7-10% for the Italian services industry (Lotti, 2007).  The 
broadband figures are closer to entry rates found for ICT firms, for example a 14.5% entry rate 
for Finnish ICT firms (Koski and Sierimo, 2003; one of the very few studies looking specifically at 
the ICT sector).  Koski and Sierimo (2003) also find that ICT industries have higher entry rates 
than other industries, although not to the degree found here and they did not focus on Internet 
service providers. The high-end adjusted broadband entry rate (from December 2005, 
annualized to 23%) is more than twice the rate from DRS.  Thus, as is to be expected in a rapidly 
growing industry,33 entry is relatively high.  There is an overall slowing in the entry rate over the 
years, but the period-to-period variation is high and the reduction in the entry rate is not 
smoothly decreasing.  While the variation in the entry rate may point to some underlying 
incompleteness in the data,34 it may also merely reflect the volatile nature of the market. 
Entrants are small in the national market, compared both to the entire market and to 
incumbents.  The entrants’ share of the market (ESH, also shown in Table 1 and Table 2; refer to 
section II.B.2 for its definition) is only 0.1-0.3% across most of the periods.  This is much smaller 
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 DRS drop small manufacturing firms since the geographic extent of their market definition is the entire 
US and small firms are not very important in that context.  The nature of broadband service provision, 
however, means that even small firms may be very important to subscribers within the area they serve.  
Subscribers cannot go to larger firms offering service in other areas, and the relevant options for the 
household or business include all market participants, no matter how small.  Furthermore, excluding 
smaller firms would exclude virtually all rural telecommunication carriers, which are important providers 
of broadband in many rural areas. 
32
 The simple average of the manufacturing entry rates reported over 1963-1982 in DRS (for firms of all 
sizes) is 9.8%. 
33
 See Siegfried and Evans (1994), p. 127. 
34
 One unanswered question is why is the entry rate is always higher in the December filings.  One 
possibility is that some firms did not actually update their mid-year data as they were supposed to, but 
instead submitted the same ZIP code list as for the previous December filing. If that were so, however, 
then the exit rates should always be substantially higher in the June periods, which is not the case. 
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than DRS’ figures for manufacturing, but at least some of the difference is accounted for by their 
five-year periods, which gives entrants more time to grow their market share.  Entrants are also 
seen to be small by considering their relative size (ERS), which is always well below one (ERS 
equal to one would imply that the entrants are just as large as incumbents).  In fact, ERS is 
typically in the range 1.2-3.0%, which implies that incumbents as a group are 33-83 times larger 
than entrants are in a typical round.  DRS also find that entrants are smaller in terms of market 
share and relative size to incumbents, although not to this degree. 
The exit rate (XR) also generally trends downward, from the highest unadjusted rate of 
11.1% (June 2006) to the lowest rate of 5.4% at the end of the sample (see Table 1).  The 
average unadjusted exit rate is 16.5% per annum.  This is about twice as high as the yearly exit 
rate for manufacturing firms from DRS, about three times as high as for the services industry 
(Lotti, 2007), and 1.8 times as high as for ICT firms (Koski and Sierimo, 2003).  Even the adjusted 
annualized average exit rate of 11% (Table 2) is higher than in these other industries.  The 
turnover rates (the sum of the entry and exit rates) of about 35% (unadjusted) and 25% 
(adjusted) are both higher than the turnover rates found by Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and 
Schivardi (2005) in 10 OECD countries for the manufacturing, business, and business services 
sectors. 
Comparison with the entry rate reveals two interesting facts.  First, the exit rate is lower 
on average than the entry rate, which reflects that the number of firms in the market is growing 
during 2005 to 2008.  More interesting, however, is how much of the dynamism of the market 
one would miss if only net entry were examined.  Net entry in the US market is about 3.1% per 
year during this period.35 The gross entry and exit rates, which are in the range 11-30% per year 
(unadjusted) or 8-23% per year (adjusted), contrast markedly with the slower net growth rate.  
Any entry analysis conducted on the publicly available FCC data, which provides only the count 
of firms operating each period, would miss much of the action.36 
As with the entrants, exiting broadband providers are also smaller than other firms in 
general.  However, they are usually larger than entrants, which is in accord with the findings of 
DRS.  The share of the exiting firms (XSH) is less than one-ninth in all periods, and averages 1.6% 
in the adjusted data.  Exiting providers are also small relative to surviving firms (XRS), which is 
always less than one except for December 2006, which has an outlier of 157%.  The December 
2006 figure is abnormally high because of the Verizon acquisition of MCI; the latter was much 
larger than the typical exiting firm.  Except for December 2006, XRS is in the range of 3-8%, 
which implies that surviving firms as a group are 13 to 36 times as large as exiting firms in typical 
periods.   
Changing our focus to the US-BB market, in which each broadband type is treated as a 
distinct market, we see from Table 3 (unadjusted data) and Table 4 (adjusted) that the entry and 
exit rates are even higher than they are in the US market.  Table 3 and Table 4 report the simple 
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 By our count, there were 1,226 distinct holding companies offering some sort of broadband service in 
June 2005, and 1,344 in June 2008 (for a continuous growth rate of 3.1% per year).  
36
 See footnote20. 
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average of the figures for each broadband type for a round.  When markets are delineated by 
broadband type a more dynamic picture of the market emerges than is shown by the US market.  
The unadjusted entry rate averages an annualized 32.4%, with 23.6% for the adjusted rate, and 
both decline over time as the market matures.  The entry rates are more than two to three 
times the entry rate of manufacturing firms found by DRS.37   The exit rates of 23.2% 
(unadjusted) and 14.5% (adjusted) are also higher than the exit rates for the US market or for 
manufacturing firms from DRS.   
In the ZIP market, we must confront a difficulty in our data.  With such a narrow 
definition of the market, there are some markets in which no broadband is offered.  Since the 
count of service providers in the market appears in the denominator of the entry rate (see 
section II.B.2 for the definition of ER), the entry rate for the first entrant is infinite.  Following 
DRS, any of our statistics that are undefined are not included in the averages appearing in the 
tables.  Accordingly, we include a second measure of entry in Table 7, ERalt, which gives the 
fraction of firms in the market in the present round that are new entrants.  This measure has the 
advantage of being defined in the case of the first entrant (but see section II.B.2 for its different 
interpretation).38   
In the ZIP market (Table 5 and Table 6), the narrower market definition (which is closer 
to the set of services available at a single household or business location) leads to a more 
dynamic picture of entry and exit.  At annualized average rates of 37% (adjusted) to 49 % 
(unadjusted), there is far more entry than in the US, US-BB, or manufacturing markets.  Similar 
patterns are discerned as found above:  declining entry and exit rates as time passes, and more 
entry than exit.  The ZIP entry rates tend to be higher than the national-scope figures because 
the denominators are so much smaller—there were typically only a few providers in each ZIP 
code at the time.  The exit rates are lower than in the US-BB market.  Coupled with the higher 
entry rates, this implies that the net geographic expansion of broadband during the period 
proceeded at a faster pace than the growth of the national (US and US-BB) markets.  
Comparison of the ZIP market entry rates with other studies is difficult, because most 
studies use national-level markets and aggregate entry across local establishments to the firm 
level.  However, with some recalculations we can compare our data with entry rates of 
establishments in the US for the same years calculated from the US Census Bureau’s Business 
Dynamics Statistics (BDS).  Counts of establishments reflect the local presence of firms, which 
may have numerous establishments.  In this sense, each appearance of a service provider in a 
ZIP code is roughly analogous to an establishment.  Treating appearance in the ZIP code as an 
establishment, the broadband establishment entry rate in the US averages 18.3% (unadjusted) 
to 13.6% (adjusted).  This range is higher than the BDS entry rates for establishments in the 
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 DRS delineate product markets at the four-digit SIC level, which is an intermediate level of aggregation 
between the US and US-BB markets.  Mobile and wireline communications services have different four-
digit SIC codes, but all types of wired communications have the same code. 
38
 Of course, ER
alt
 is still undefined when there are no firms in the market (for then its formula calls for 
dividing zero by zero).   
21 
manufacturing (7.5%), services (12.2%), and transportation, communications, and utilities 
(13.2%) sectors.  The only sector in the BDS data approaching the level of entry we find for 
broadband is finance, insurance, and real estate, with a 13.2% entry rate. 
We now turn to the smallest market definition, the ZIP-BB market, which draws 
narrower boundaries around the market in both geographic and product space.  Each 
broadband type within a ZIP code area is treated as a distinct market.  With this narrowest 
definition of the market, ER is undefined for half of the markets due to the problem discussed 
above.  Naturally enough, ER is undefined most often for the least-common broadband types:  
BPL and fixed wireless.39  For the ZIP-BB market, the alternative entry measure ERalt may 
therefore be of particular interest, and it is reported in  Table 7 and Table 8.   
For the ZIP-BB market, we see from Table 7 and Table 8 that the entry and exit rates are 
quite a bit higher than in the US market.  The narrower market definition, which is closer to the 
set of services available at a single household or business location, leads to a more dynamic 
picture of entry and exit. The semi-annual entry rate (whether measured by ER or ERalt) 
generally declines over time, similar to the US market.  The entry rate ER is highest in June 2006 
(21.4% unadjusted, 19.7% adjusted) and lowest in December 2007 (13.2% unadjusted, 7% 
adjusted), and averages an annualized rate of 34.2% unadjusted (25.7% adjusted).  ERalt ranges 
from 12.6% to 24.9% unadjusted (averaging 36.9% per annum), meaning that between one in 
seven to one out of every four firms in a typical market is an entrant.    
The market share of entrants in the ZIP-BB market is about the same as the semi-annual 
entry rates, implying that the scale of entry in the market is similar whether measured by 
counting firms or their market share.  ESH ranges from 5.2% to 17.1%, and averages 12.0% in 
the adjusted data.  However, the average relative size of entrants is much larger than that of 
incumbents:  ERS averages 29, which is much higher than DRS found for manufacturing firms.  
The distribution of relative sizes of entrants is highly skewed, however, due to the entry of large 
firms like Verizon and AT&T into new ZIP codes.  The median ERS, which is affected little by the 
few huge entrants, ranges from 0.09 to 1.4.   
The trend in the exit rate (XR) is generally downward.  The highest exit rate of 16.8% 
(unadjusted, or 14.3% adjusted) is at the beginning and the lowest rate of 5.0% (unadjusted, or 
3.9% adjusted) is at the end of the sample.  The average annualized exit rate is 12% if adjusted, 
23% if not.  Exiting broadband providers are larger than non-exiting firms on average, as shown 
by the figures for XRS in Table 7 and Table 8, although as with the entrant relative size the 
median XRS is usually below one.  Thus the typical exiting firm is relatively small, as may be 
expected.  Excluding December 2007, surviving firms in the median markets are anywhere from 
2 to 19 times the size of exiting firms. 
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 ER is undefined for BPL in 99.9% of ZIP code-rounds, and is undefined for TFW in 79% of ZIP code-
rounds.  Other modes of service with a large number of ZIP codes-rounds with undefined ER are fiber 
(63%) and SDSL (61%). At the other end of the spectrum, ER is undefined for satellite service in only 13% 
of markets, since it is available (and has customers) in most ZIP code areas. 
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b) Disaggregating the sources of entry 
Entry is broken down by source in Table 9 and Table 10 for the US-BB market, Table 11 
and Table 12 for the ZIP market, Table 13 and Table 14 for the ZIP-BB market (refer to section 
II.B.4 for the definitions of entry types). In the US-BB market, more entry comes from new firms 
than from providers offering a new service type. In this section, only results for the adjusted 
data (Table 10, Table 12, and Table 14) are discussed for the sake of brevity. About 59% of the 
total entry rate comes from de novo entry, which is about the same as DRS found for 
manufacturing firms.   The de novo entrants have about the same market share and relative size 
as do the diversifying firms. 
Most entry in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets is from geographic expansion.  In the ZIP 
market, 92% of entry is of type GE, and the rest is de novo.  For the ZIP-BB market, 74% of entry 
is of type GE, 20% is of type DF, and the remaining entry is de novo.  So, from the consumer’s 
point of view, most entry in these markets takes the form of an existing provider beginning to 
offer service in the area.  The same is true when measuring entrants by their market share. 
In the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets, the relative size of entrant to incumbent (ERS) is much 
larger for geographically expanding than for completely new firms. In the ZIP-BB market, 
diversifying firms have the largest relative size of all.  For that market, on average, 
geographically expanding firms are 26 times as large as incumbents, product diversifiers are 42 
times as large, and completely new entrants are 3 times as large.  The average entry rates are 
highly skewed by firms with large service footprints and many existing customers expanding into 
an area previously served only by smaller providers.  The median figures for ERS in Table 12 and 
Table 14 are all below 1 except for diversifying entrants in the ZIP-BB market, which are about 
the same size as existing firms in the overall average.  The median ERS of type NF averages 0.02 
in the ZIP-BB market, indicating that a typical de novo entrant faces incumbents that are about 
40 times larger than the entrant. 
c) Disaggregating the sources of exit 
By categorizing the modes of exit, we are able to examine where firms go or remain 
when they exit a market. The disaggregation of the exit rates is in Table 15 and Table 16Table 10 
for the US-BB market, Table 17 and Table 18 for the ZIP market, Table 19 and Table 20 for the 
ZIP-BB market.  Again, we focus on the adjusted statistics.  In the US-BB market, a firm can exit 
by completely disappearing (exit type EF) or by reducing its product mix (type CF).  The exit rates 
show that two-thirds of exit coincides with the withdrawal of the firm from all modes of 
provision.  Coupled with the results for the entry rates, we find that diversification into and 
consolidation out of other service types together account for the minor part of the dynamics in 
the US-BB market.  
In addition to exit type EF, in the ZIP market a firm can also exit by contraction in the 
geographic dimension (exit type GC). The lion’s share of exit is of the latter type. The figures for 
the exit rates for the ZIP market in Table 18 show that just as most entry stems from geographic 
expansion, most exit reflects geographic contraction.  The importance of geographic 
consolidation in exit is even larger in terms of market share.  The relative size of consolidating 
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firms is also greater than the relative size of completely disappearing firms, whether looking at 
mean or median XRS.  This finding seems to imply that larger firms are engaged in more dynamic 
geographic behavior overall than are smaller firms.  The small incumbent ILEC offering service in 
a few rural ZIP codes may never exit, but neither may it expand to other areas.  In summary, 
most entry and exit in the ZIP market comes from geographic movement, and much expansion 
and consolidation comes from larger firms.    
In the ZIP-BB market a firm can exit by all three routes.  As in the ZIP market, most exit 
in the ZIP-BB market reflects geographic contraction.  On average, 55% of exiting firms are of 
type GC, 26% are of type CF, and the remaining 19% completely exit all markets (Table 20).  
Measuring exit by market shares instead does not change the relative importance of the three 
modes of exit. 
The relative size of consolidating firms, whether by geography or product mix, average 
or median, is generally greater than the relative size of completely disappearing firms.  This 
appears to indicate that firms shrink (or never grew) before they die.  From the statistics for XRS 
in Table 20, the disappearing firms are on average 2.5 times larger than remaining firms, 
whereas by the median completely exiting firms are only 16% as large as are firms continuing in 
the market. Geographic consolidators are 28 times larger on average than firms remaining in the 
market, but only 15% as large when looking at the median (the one statistic that is about the 
same as for EF exit).  Product mix reducers are 15 times larger than remaining firms on average, 
but only 60% as large by median.  The comparisons of mean to median again reflect that a few 
large firms are engaged in more dynamic behavior overall than are smaller firms.  
B. Variation in Entry and Exit across Broadband Types 
1. Variation across types of service 
The average statistics in the previous section mask a great amount of variation in the 
entry and exit rates among different types of broadband service.  In this section, we distinguish 
between modes of provision to examine how the measures of entry and exit vary across time 
and (for the ZIP-BB market) geography.  By doing so, we can compare both the mean and 
variance of entry and exit across types of broadband. 
Table 21 (unadjusted data) and Table 22 (adjusted) present the average, median, and 
first-to-ninth decile spread in the entry rates for the US-BB and Figures for the ZIP-BB markets 
are in Table 23 (unadjusted data) and Table 24 (adjusted).  In the US-BB market, variation occurs 
only across periods.  Looking at the statistics for the mean entry rates in Table 21 and Table 22, 
it appears that some types of broadband experienced much more entry than others.  At one 
extreme, there was no entry at all in the satellite broadband market at the national level, a 
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symptom of the entry barriers from the risk and huge sunk costs of deploying satellites.40  The 
highest entry rate is for mobile wireless, with a mean entry rate with the adjusted data of 38%.  
From the greatest to the least average entry rate, the order is mobile wireless, fiber, BPL, fixed 
wireless, cable modem, SDSL, ADSL, and satellite.  The most mature markets, those for DSL and 
cable modem, show up with relatively lower growth rates, as may be expected.41  In addition to 
being a relatively new market, mobile wireless may also have a high entry rate due to the lower 
entry barriers from sunk costs.42  For some broadband types, there is a lot of variation in the 
entry rate across time in the US-BB market, as seen from the range of ER (also in Table 21 and 
Table 22).  For example, adjusted mobile broadband entry rates range from 5% to 75% across 
the first to ninth decile range.  The range of entry rates is much narrower for some other types 
such as ADSL and fiber (and, in the extreme with no entry at all, satellite).   
In the ZIP-BB market, variation occurs not only across the six rounds of data but also 
across ZIP code areas.  It is apparent from the statistics in Table 23 and Table 24 that the local 
markets are highly dynamic, and that there is a great variety of outcomes within each 
broadband type.  In particular, comparison to the comparable statistics for the US-BB market 
shows that the local markets are much more dynamic than the national market, and also that 
there is a greater variety of outcomes within each broadband type in the ZIP-BB market.  These 
results follow in part from the small geographic scale of the ZIP-BB market and the small number 
of providers in a ZIP code.43    
Table 23 and Table 24 also show that, similar to the US-BB market, entry is much more 
prominent in some broadband types than others at the ZIP code level.  In the adjusted data 
(Table 24), the entry rate is highest for mobile wireless (as in the national market), at 27%, and 
lowest for cable modem.  The ranking of the entry rates is similar but not identical to that in the 
national market (the Spearman correlation between the rankings is positive).  From the greatest 
to the least average entry rate, the order is: mobile wireless, fiber, satellite, ADSL, SDSL, fixed 
wireless, cable modem, and BPL.44  Entry in the satellite market looks quite different in the ZIP-
BB market, compared to the national level.  While there are no new satellite broadband 
providers at the national level during this period, there are many local markets where the 
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 There are four satellite providers who remain in the data throughout all rounds, one of which offers 
service only in Alaska. 
41
 In many theoretical models of industry dynamics, the entry rate falls as the industry matures. See 
Prieger (2007) and Klepper (1996).   
42
 For the argument that wireless broadband has lower sunk cost than wired broadband, see U.S. 
Department of Justice, Ex Parte Comments, op. cit., section II.E.  For a review of the confirmatory 
empirical evidence on the importance of sunk cost as an entry barrier, see Siegfried and Evans (1994), at 
section II.B.1.a, and references cited therein. 
43
 A firm beginning to offer ADSL may be the first, second, or third entrant in a given ZIP code in which it 
offers service, which explains both the higher entry rates in the ZIP-BB market as well as the great 
variance in the entry rate. 
44
 Since there is only one BPL provider at most in a market, the entry rate for BPL is always either zero or 
undefined, which is why it is ranked last in terms of ER. 
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satellite firms enter by picking up customers where they formerly had none.45  So, while the 
entry rate for satellite is zero in the national market, it is ranked fifth in the ZIP-BB market.   
The distribution of the exit statistics in the US-BB market are in Table 25 and Table 26.  
As there is with the entry rates, there is great variation among types.  Nevertheless, except for 
satellite broadband, the average exit rate is smaller than the entry rate for the same type of 
service, implying that there was net entry into each type of broadband service.  In order from 
the greatest to the least average exit rate, we have mobile wireless, SDSL, fixed wireless, 
satellite, fiber, cable modem, ADSL.  There is no exit at all in the US-BB market for BPL.  The 
ranges for the exit rates (shown below the mean and median in column one of Table 25 and 
Table 26) show less variation than there was in entry.  The distributions of the exit statistics in 
the ZIP-BB market are in Table 27 and Table 28.  With the adjusted data, in order from the 
greatest to the least average exit rate the order is SDSL with a 16.5% exit rate, fiber, fixed 
wireless, mobile wireless, ADSL, BPL, cable modem and satellite (with the latter two tied at 
2.6%).46 
Comparing the time-averaged entry and exit rates in the US-BB market, we see that 
types with high entry rates also tend to have high exit rates.  The correlation between the time-
averaged entry rates (shares) in Table 22 and the exit rates (shares) in Table 26  is 0.66 (0.20) for 
the US-BB market.  Thus, similar patterns emerge for entry and exit across markets: when entry 
is high or has a large share for a broadband type, exit does too.  DRS also found large positive 
correlation between entry and exit in manufacturing as well.  Positive correlation between time- 
(and geography-) averaged entry and exit rates, shares, and relative sizes is also present in the 
ZIP-BB market:  0.11 for the rates, 0.40 for the shares, and 0.60 for the relative sizes (all with the 
adjusted data in Table 24 and Table 28).  Thus, as DRS (p. 507) conclude, “while there is 
substantial variation in entry and exit patterns across [markets] within a sector [which is the 
broadband type, in our application], there are also some systematic relationships between entry 
and exit….”  Positive correlation between entry and exit implies  that there is less variation in 
the net entry rate across markets than there is in the gross entry and exit rates, yet another 
indication that examining net entry alone leaves would fail to uncover much of the market 
dynamics. We examine the systematic relationships between entry and exit in more detail in the 
following section. 
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 It is important to note that “entry” for the satellite firms mainly reflects changes in demand, not supply, 
since the firms do not deploy new infrastructure to “enter” a new ZIP code.  That is not to say that the 
firms did not perhaps engage in targeted marketing efforts in certain areas. 
46
 The small exit rate for satellite service comes from fact that only two firms exited the national market 
during the period, and that the service footprints of the other providers did not change.  Exit in the 
satellite ZIP-BB market nearly always comes from losing all customers in a ZIP code, not from making the 
service physically unavailable. 
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2. Variation across geographic regions 
The average statistics in section A above also mask differences in the entry and exit 
rates among different regions of the US.  In this section, we examine how the entry and exit vary 
by geography in the ZIP markets.  Table 29 for the unadjusted data shows that the entry rate is 
much higher in some areas than others.  Entry is greatest in the West North Central region,47 
where the entry rate is 50% higher than in the Pacific states of California, Oregon, and 
Washington, which have the lowest entry rate.  The Pacific region exhibits the lowest growth 
rate because the broadband market there was the most mature at the beginning of the period. 
The Pacific ZIP codes had an average of 6.7 broadband service providers in 2005, whereas the 
West North Central ZIP codes averaged only 3.3 providers. Entrants also have the largest shares 
in the West North Central states and the lowest shares in New England.  The relative size of 
entrants also varies widely across the regions.  Roughly similar patterns are found with the 
adjusted data in Table 30. 
There is proportionally much less variation in average exit rates across the regions (see 
Table 31 for the unadjusted statistics and Table 32 for the adjusted figures).  The exiter shares 
are also mostly similar across regions, particular with the adjusted data. 
C. Correlation in Entry and Exit 
To look at market-specific differences in entry and exit, we follow DRS and ask two 
questions.  First, are the measures of entry and exit positively autocorrelated?  If so, then the 
implication is that high entry (for example) in one period is likely to be followed by high entry in 
succeeding periods.  Second, do high entry rates correspond with high exit rates?  If so, then 
there would appear to be underlying factors causing the “churn rate” of firms in a market to be 
more stable within markets than across markets.  We deal with these two questions in turn in 
this section. 
1. Autocorrelation of entry and of exit 
In Table 33 through Table 38, we present the autocorrelations for entry and exit in the 
US-BB, ZIP, and ZIP-BB markets.48  Here we focus on the adjusted figures for the ZIP-BB market, 
presented in Table 38 Both the entry and exit rates show positive autocorrelation for all 
measures and at all lags, excepting only the fifth autocorrelation for the entry rate.  DRS 
interpreted their similar finding for the manufacturing industry as suggesting that there are 
persistent market-specific factors that affect both entry and exit.  In other words, when entry is 
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 The West North Central states are IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, ND, and SD. 
48
 By conventional measures, the correlations are all highly statistically significant except in a few cases.  
However, since the data are a census of the entire population, from the viewpoint of finite population 
statistics the correlations are descriptive population quantities (Pfeffermann, 1993), not estimates, and 
thus have no variance.  The significance levels reported in the tables are for the interpretation, more 
familiar to econometricians, of the data as a finite population drawn from an infinite superpopulation. 
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higher in, say, the mobile wireless market in an area in a period than the average entry rate for 
all markets, then it is likely that the entry rate will continue to be higher in that mobile wireless 
market.  Thus, there is evidence for factors unique to each mode of broadband provision or each 
location that determine the dynamics of the market. The autocorrelations for the entry and exit 
rates in the ZIP-BB market are generally smaller than in the ZIP market, where all types of 
broadband are grouped (refer to Table 36 for comparison).  The comparison indicates that 
broadband type-specific determinants of market dynamics are more persistent and important 
than are location-specific determinants. 
2. Correlation between entry and exit 
The second question regarding market-specific differences in entry and exit is whether 
high entry and exit tend to occur together in a market.  To address this, we calculate the 
correlation between each entry measure and its counterpart on the exit side, at various leads 
and lags.  We already noted in section B above that the time-averaged entry and exit measures 
for the broadband types were positive correlated, which suggests that entry and exit are 
systematically and positive related within markets.  DRS and several other empirical studies of 
market dynamics find that entry and exit rates are positively correlated across industries.49  
Geroski (1995) refers to this result as the third stylized fact about entry in the manufacturing 
sector, which has been found in other sectors as well (Lotti, 2007). 
In this section, we refine that conclusion in three ways.  First, we look at how entry is 
correlated with exit at other periods, as well as contemporaneously, to be able to answer (for 
example) how entry today correlates with exit six months or a year later. Second, we now 
consider the correlation between entry and exit in a single market over time, not just how entry 
relates to exit when both are first averaged across time and all ZIP codes (the latter only in the 
case of the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets).   Third, we also see whether the apparent positive 
correlation we find between entry and exit is due solely to unobserved, fixed market-specific 
factors.  Removing such factors allows us to examine whether periods with entry that is high 
relative to that market correspond to high (or low) exit in the same market.   
The results are in Table 39 for US-BB market, Table 40 for the ZIP market, and Table 41 
for the ZIP-BB market. The correlation between the contemporaneous entry and exit rates in the 
US-BB market is positive, at 0.47 (unadjusted) or 0.17 (adjusted; for both, see the entries for the 
XRt row in the first and third columns of Table 39), which means that broadband types with 
higher than average entry rates also tend to have higher than average exit rates.  The 
correlation of the entry rate with previous and future exit rates is also positive (see the other 
figures in the first and third columns of Table 39), demonstrating that there is persistence in the 
association between entry and exit.  Thus, broadband types with high entry rates in general over 
time also have high exit rates, and broadband types with low entry rates have low exit rates.  
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 The theoretical model of Asplund and Nocke (2006) shows that entry and exit rates may rise together in 
response to an increase in fixed costs.   
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With a few exceptions, the entry and exit rates are also positively correlated in the ZIP (first and 
third columns of Table 40) and ZIP-BB markets (first and third columns of Table 41), although the 
correlations are smaller than for the US-BB market.  All these results also hold when looking at 
shares instead of rates (see the bottom halves of the tables).   
One possible cause for the positive correlation between entry and exit—that is, the 
existence of “churn” in the market—may be that there are systematic differences in the height 
of entry and exit barriers among the broadband types.  Economic theory suggests many reasons 
why entry and exit barriers may be positively related within a market, and two may apply to the 
broadband service market in particular.50  First, exit barriers are themselves entry barriers to 
forward looking firms.  An exit barrier such as regulatory pressure to continue operating in a 
market even with losses makes it less likely that firms would want to enter.51  Second, when 
incumbents have cost advantages over potential entrants, creating an entry barrier, the 
advantages often come from specific assets with little scrap value.  When a large portion of 
capital costs are sunk (i.e., non-recoverable), as may be the case particularly with wired 
broadband,52 then (conditional on entry having occurred) exit is discouraged because the 
opportunity cost of remaining in the market is lower.53  
In the second and fourth columns of the tables, the time-averages within each market 
(the market fixed effects) have been removed before computing the correlations between the 
measures of entry and exit.  Correcting for the market fixed effects allows us to address the 
question of whether periods of relatively high entry (where “high” means relative only to other 
periods within the same market) in a market are also periods of relatively high exit.54  If firms 
were homogeneous, we would expect the opposite, at least in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets. Since 
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 See Siegfried and Evans (1994), p.147, and references cited therein. 
51
 The pressure to remain in an unprofitable market need not take the form of formal designation as a 
broadband carrier of last resort.  Regulators in some states, and the FCC itself, have pushed 
telecommunications firms for many years to expand their broadband offerings, especially in areas labeled 
“disadvantaged.”  For example, the FCC approved the SBC acquisition of Ameritech in 1999 only subject to 
an agreement by the company to promote broadband Internet access (among other conditions).  In 
particular, SBC was required to locate at least 10% of their advanced service facilities in low-income areas 
in the Ameritech region.  State regulators in Ameritech’s operating region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin) also pushed the merged firm to accelerate broadband deployment.  Presumably 
neither the federal nor the state regulators would have been satisfied to see the firm begin to offer 
broadband in low-income areas only to have the service offerings cease after a short period.  See Prieger 
and Hu (2008). 
52 
See U.S. Department of Justice, Ex Parte Comments, op. cit., section II.E. 
53
 See Siegfried and Evans (1994), p.145:  “Tangible barriers to exit may include sunk costs in durable, 
industry-specific assets, which discourage exit because such assets do not have valuable alternative 
uses….”  These authors conclude the balance of the empirical evidence supports this assertion. 
54
 The correlations without correcting for market fixed effects (in the first and third columns of Table 39 
for US-BB market, Table 40 for the ZIP market, and Table 41 for the ZIP-BB market) mostly picks up 
differences among markets in entry and exit.  Once the time averages are removed from each market, 
then all (average) differences among markets are removed, and the remaining correlation isolates how 
entry and exit within each market are related.  
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firms present in these local markets are likely to be in head-to-head competition with each 
other, homogeneity would imply entrants and exiters would respond inversely to changes in 
expected market profits.  When expected profitability is high, perhaps due to increased demand 
in the market, firms would be more likely to enter and less likely to leave (Siegfried and Evans, 
1994).  We find mild negative correlation in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets:  periods with higher 
entry than average within a market are also periods of relatively low exit, although the level of 
the association is quite small.  The small magnitude of the correlation may be due to substantial 
heterogeneity among the firms’ profit functions, resulting in little correlation between the entry 
and exit decisions of the various players in the market. 
It is also interesting to examine how entry in one period relates to exit in another.  For 
example, the correlation in the US-BB market between the entry rate in period t and the exit 
rate in period t+1 is positive in the unadjusted data.  This means that periods of high entry tend 
to be followed immediately by relatively high exit.  While this may be an artifact of spurious “hit 
and run” entry, this pattern could also arise either because firms were overoptimistic in entering 
the market and are shortly forced to exit, or because the arrival of entrants forces incumbents 
who cannot compete to exit.  Similarly, in the US-BB market the correlation between the entry 
rate in period t and the exit rate the previous period is also positive (whether looking at the 
unadjusted or adjusted data).  Thus, periods of high exit tend to be followed by a period of 
relatively high entry.  This could happen because of the “vacuum effect,” where exiting firms 
create opportunities for more efficient entrants to enter and pick up the stranded subscribers.55  
However, these patterns found in the national level market do not carry over to the local (ZIP 
and ZIP-BB) markets, where it would be easiest to interpret such findings as due to direct 
competition.  The correlations in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets are generally quite small. 
DRS found that there was negative correlation between the contemporaneous entry 
and exit rates but not with the market shares.  We have a similar result in, for example, the 
adjusted data for the US-BB market.  DRS discuss that result: 
In this case the entrants’ market share is positively correlated with the exiters’ 
share after [market fixed] effects have been removed.  Periods of higher than 
average entrant shares are thus periods of higher than average exiter shares. 
Since these are periods with relatively low exit rates, the exiting firms in these 
periods must tend to be unusually large (DRS, p.508).  
IV. Conclusions 
We collect the findings of our work here, and conclude by discussing some avenues for 
future work. 
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 Siegfried and Evans (1994) discuss the vacuum effect and related literature on p.147. 
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Finding 1:  There is a tremendous amount of (simultaneous) entry and exit in the US 
broadband market, however the market is defined. 
The large amount of entry is particularly striking considering that the provision of 
broadband has several economic characteristics that are typically associated with barriers to 
entry.  There are large fixed or sunk costs that create absolute cost disadvantages for entrants.  
The technology also leads to economies of scale, network economies, and economies of scope 
in the provision of multiple modes of broadband (e.g. ADSL and SDSL) that create relative cost 
disadvantages for entrants.56  Apparently the dominant factor in the market, the growing 
demand for broadband service, trumped all other considerations during the period of study.   
Furthermore, the fact that there is a high “churn rate” of firms in broadband markets 
has interesting implications for research analyzing entry decisions.  The presence of 
simultaneous entry and exit implies that structural models for entry assuming homogeneous 
firms (Breshnahan and Reiss, 1991) or models relying on the number of firms in the market as 
sufficient statistics (e.g., Xiao and Orazem (2011) for broadband markets and Greenstein and 
Mazzeo (2006) in the closely related industry of competitive local telephone services) may not 
be the most appropriate for the US broadband market.  Instead, models incorporating 
heterogeneity among firms’ profit functions (POB), private information (Doraszelski and 
Satterthwaite, 2010), differing levels of strategic sophistication or rationality (Goldfarb and Xiao, 
2011) or learning (Hanazono and Yang, 2009) may be more promising.   
Finding 2:  Most entry is from existing providers expanding into new geographic areas.  
Existing firms diversifying their service offerings is the next most common form of entry.  
In the ZIP-BB market, 71% of entry (75% by share) is from geographic expansion of 
established service providers, and 21% is from product diversification within the area.  Entrants 
into a market average 64% of the size of the incumbents combined, and thus are relatively large. 
Thus, notwithstanding potential antitrust concerns about the dominance of large broadband 
providers, as evinced by the DOJ and FCC in the recent review of the proposed merger of AT&T 
and T-Mobile USA, it appears that a large share of new options provided to consumers has come 
from these firms.  
Finding 3:  Entry and exit varies widely across the various modes of provision, and the 
highest entry rates also generally have the highest entrant shares. 
The markets for some modes of provision are more stable than others, and this suggests 
future work explicitly modeling asymmetric competition among intermodal competitors, as in 
the work by Loomis and Swann (2005).  
Finding 4:  Entry rates, entrant shares, and the relative sizes of entrants display positive 
autocorrelation in the US-BB market.  The same is true for exit. 
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 Siegfried and Evans (1994), section II.B. 
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The implication is that there are persistent factors specific to both the broadband mode 
and the ZIP code area that cause high entry (or exit) in one period to be followed by high entry 
(exit) in succeeding periods.  The type-specific factors appear to be more important than the 
location-specific factors, but both appear to be present. 
Finding 5:  Without controlling for market-specific factors, there generally is positive 
correlation between the entry and exit rates at various leads and lags. 
Broadband markets with higher than average entry rates also tend to have higher than 
average exit rates, whether contemporaneously or at other leads and lags, demonstrating that 
there is persistence in the association between entry and exit.  This persistence suggests that 
there are systematic differences in the height of entry and exit barriers among the broadband 
types.  There appear to be underlying factors causing the “churn rate” of firms in a market to be 
more stable within than across markets.   
We intend that these findings can both stimulate and guide future empirical and 
theoretical work in the broadband market.  Although the FCC data examined here are 
confidential, the new National Broadband Map has publicly available data on which companies 
offer specific types of broadband service in fine geographic detail.   Thus, as new rounds of the 
semiannual National Broadband Map data become available, the dynamics of the US broadband 
market can be studied by all. 
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Appendix 
This data appendix explains more about how entry and exit were determined in the 
data.  To begin with, recall that broadband provided in a ZCTA is first linked to the relevant 
holding company, and all service providers held by the same holding company are grouped and 
treated as a single firm. This is the same method used by the FCC for its own statistics.  Then, in 
a first pass through the data, we mark entry and exit as described in sections II.B.2 and II.B.3.  
Here we describe the procedures for the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets; the process is similar for the 
US and US-BB markets.   
Each firm present in each ZCTA and broadband type is marked with one of the following 
entry codes: 
1. The same firm offered service of the same type in the same ZCTA in the previous 
round:  no entry. 
2. The same firm offered service of any type nowhere in the previous round:  counts as 
de novo entry in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets (see section II.B.4 for the nomenclature 
for the various types of entry and exit). 
3. The same firm offered service of some type elsewhere but not in the same ZCTA in 
the previous round:  counts as entry through geographic expansion in the ZIP and 
ZIP-BB markets. 
4. The same firm offered service of some other type in the same ZCTA in the previous 
round:  counts as entry through diversification in the ZIP-BB market but does not 
count as entry in the ZIP market. 
 
Each firm present in each ZCTA and broadband type is marked with one of the following 
exit codes: 
1. The same firm offers service of the same type in the same ZCTA in the next round:  
no exit. 
2. The same firm offers no service of any type anywhere in the next round:  counts as 
an exiting firm in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets (see section II.B.4 for the nomenclature 
for the various types of entry and exit). 
3. The same firm offers no service of any in the same ZCTA, but continues to offer 
service of some sort elsewhere in the next round:  counts as exit by geographic 
contraction in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets. 
4. The same firm offers service of some other type in the same ZCTA in the next round, 
but does not continue to offer service of the same type:  counts as exit through 
consolidation in the ZIP-BB market but does not count as exit in the ZIP market. 
 
After this initial marking of entry and exit, we modified the entry and exit category 
assignments to account for corporate reorganization such as mergers and spinoffs.  We 
identified seven types of corporate reorganization events in the data: 
36 
(1) Acquisition of one holding company by another 
The identification number (HoCo ID) of the acquiring firm is used to identify the holding 
company after the acquisition.  Any entry of types 2-4 (refer to the list above) that result from a 
nominal change in the HoCo ID due to the acquisition are recoded accordingly.  Some examples, 
when firm A acquires firm B:  
 
Example Pre-merger (round N -1) Post-merger (round N) 
Final entry code 
in round N 
1 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 1 1 
2 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 2 (only) 4 
3 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 1 
Firm B, BB type 2 
1 
4 
3 Firm A, BB type 1 
Firm B, BB type 1 
Firm B, BB type 1 
Firm B, BB type 2 
1 
4 
 
Any exit of types 2-4 (refer to the list above) that result from a nominal change in the 
HoCo ID due to the acquisition are recoded accordingly.  Some examples, when firm A acquires 
firm B:  
 
Example Pre-merger (round N -1) Post-merger (round N) 
Final exit code in 
round N-1 
1 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 1 1 
2 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 2 (only) 4 
3 Firm A, BB type 1 Firm B, BB type 1 
Firm B, BB type 2 
1 
4 
4 Firm A, BB type 1  
Firm A, BB type 2 
Firm B, BB type 1 
 
1 
4 
5 Firm A, BB type 1  
Firm B, BB type 1 
 
Firm B, BB type 1 
2 
1 
6 Firm A, BB type 1  ∅  3 
 
(2) Two to one mergers of holding companies. 
The identification number of the dominant partner (HoCo ID) in the merger is used to 
identify the holding company after the merger.  Any entry or exit of types 2-4 (refer to the list 
above) that result from a nominal change in the HoCo ID due to the merger are recoded 
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accordingly.  The examples for the previous case above also apply to this case, when firm B 
acquires firm A.  
(3) Three to one mergers of holding companies. 
There is one instance of a three to one merger during the time studied.  Choice One 
Communications, CTC Communications, and Conversent Communications merged to form One 
Communications Corp. in July 2006. Choice One Communications Inc. is (somewhat arbitrarily) 
treated as the dominant partner in this merger. Some examples of the recoding of entry 
required in this case (in addition to recoding as in the examples for acquisitions above when 
only two of the three firms are present in the local market in rounds N-1 and N) are:  
 
Example Pre-merger (round N -1) Post-merger (round N) 
Final entry code 
in round N 
1 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 1 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 1 
2 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 2 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 2 
1 
1 
3 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 1 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 2 
1 
4 
3 CTC Comm., BB type 1 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 2 
1 
4 
 
Any exit of types 2-4 (refer to the list above) that result from a nominal change in the 
HoCo ID due to the acquisition are recoded accordingly.  Some examples (again in addition to 
recoding as in the examples for acquisitions above):  
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Example Pre-merger (round N -1) Post-merger (round N) 
Final exit code in 
round N-1 
1 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 1 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 1 
2 
2 
2 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 2 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 2 
1 
1 
2 
3 CTC Comm., BB type 1 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 1 
 
1 
2 
4 Choice One, BB type 1 
CTC Comm., BB type 2 
Conversent, BB type 1 
One Comm., BB type 2 2 
1 
2 
 
(4) Complex acquisitions (three to two merger). 
There is one complex acquisition in the date.  Comcast and Time Warner Cable acquired 
the assets of Adelphia Cable in 2005, and at the same time unwound Comcast’s interests in Time 
Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment.  In some markets where Adelphia held assets, 
after the acquisition both Comcast and Time Warner Cable appear as entrants after the first-
round pass through the data.  This may reflect that there were two separate Adelphia cable 
systems in the area, one of which went to each company.  In such cases, only Time Warner 
Cable is (arbitrarily) marked as an entrant.  Other than this case, the procedures for acquisitions 
and mergers outlined above are followed. 
(5) Reverse mergers and spin-offs. 
When a firm splits into two firms or spins off some of its assets to another corporation, 
any apparent entry or exit due only to the nominal change in the owner of the assets is not 
treated as entry or exit.  Examples of this sort of corporate reorganization include the Sprint-
Nextel spinoff of its local landline telecommunications business as Embarq in May 2006 and the 
ALLTEL spinoff of landline assets as Windstream, which merged with Valor Communications 
Group, in July 2006. The examples for recoding of entry and exit from case (1) above 
(acquisitions), interpreting firm A as the firm spinning off assets to firm B, also apply here.  
(6) The unwinding of a 50-50 partnership. 
In cases where an equal partnership is dissolved and the assets are converted to wholly 
owned status by one or the other of the partners, the new status is not treated as entry or exit, 
even though the holding company of record may change in the data.  This case applies to the 
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division of jointly owned cable systems in the Midwest by Comcast and Insight Communications 
in 2007. 
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Table 1:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the US Broadband Market (Unadjusted Data)  
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.152 0.084 0.137 0.063 0.083 0.056 0.192 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.003 0.038 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.019 0.420 0.039 0.019 0.011 0.025 0.089 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.100 0.110 0.081 0.085 0.064 0.054 0.165 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.022 0.010 0.084 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.021 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.205 0.080 1.041 0.032 0.023 0.028 0.235 
Table notes:  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The US market has the geographic extent of the entire US and groups all 
broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for 
definitions of statistics. 
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Table 2:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the US Broadband Market (Adjusted Data) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.116 0.056 0.085 0.047 0.057 0.046 0.136 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.022 0.356 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.029 0.076 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.085 0.055 0.055 0.048 0.045 0.042 0.110 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.003 0.004 0.083 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.016 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.028 0.076 1.569 0.050 0.029 0.036 0.298 
Table notes:  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The US market has the geographic extent of the entire US and groups all 
broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for 
definitions of statistics. 
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Table 3:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market (Unadjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.283 0.180 0.166 0.123 0.124 0.096 0.324 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.032 0.050 0.024 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.022 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.118 0.198 0.134 0.083 0.074 0.081 0.115 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.183 0.175 0.107 0.112 0.078 0.042 0.232 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.035 0.052 0.050 0.014 0.023 0.006 0.030 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.230 0.350 0.866 0.116 0.294 0.107 0.327 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer 
to section II.B.5). See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 4:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market (Adjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.161 0.189 0.092 0.072 0.106 0.089 0.236 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.022 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.015 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.120 0.155 0.093 0.102 0.079 0.085 0.106 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.170 0.058 0.052 0.069 0.053 0.033 0.145 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.028 0.030 0.040 0.009 0.020 0.005 0.022 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.194 0.454 1.240 0.140 0.453 0.112 0.432 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to 
section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 5:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market (Unadjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes)  
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.339 0.309 0.204 0.259 0.153 0.193 0.486 
Alternate Entry Rate (ER
alt
) 0.234 0.218 0.147 0.193 0.129 0.142 0.354 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.097 0.185 0.138 0.320 0.155 0.271 0.194 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 2.433 3.631 6.014 26.598 5.961 40.527 14.194 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.117 0.096 0.071 0.099 0.135 0.038 0.185 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.079 0.046 0.049 0.098 0.245 0.016 0.089 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 7.997 3.666 3.006 3.817 24.863 1.089 7.406 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 6:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market (Adjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.299 0.274 0.144 0.230 0.088 0.082 0.372 
Alternate Entry Rate (ER
alt
) 0.208 0.191 0.105 0.162 0.068 0.065 0.266 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.079 0.145 0.110 0.287 0.044 0.059 0.121 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 1.750 2.460 6.218 23.396 2.403 3.141 6.561 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.100 0.045 0.046 0.026 0.033 0.026 0.092 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.043 0.018 0.026 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.018 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 1.466 1.870 1.696 1.396 0.228 0.236 1.149 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 7:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market (Unadjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes and Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.189 0.214 0.146 0.190 0.132 0.154 0.342 
Alternate Entry Rate (ER
alt
) 0.249 0.230 0.177 0.190 0.134 0.126 0.369 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.203 0.204 0.170 0.192 0.122 0.144 0.173 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS)        
average 21.03 19.85 19.12 96.80 14.61 282.6 75.67 
median 0.090 0.251 0.376 0.624 0.332 2.043 0.619 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.168 0.114 0.091 0.127 0.142 0.050 0.231 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.158 0.101 0.068 0.121 0.157 0.038 0.107 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS)        
average 6.859 69.566 6.673 32.87 59.30 7.102 30.40 
median 0.502 0.226 0.051 0.406 2.488 0.090 0.627 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the 
data (refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 8:  Entry and Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market (Adjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes and Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.157 0.197 0.112 0.163 0.070 0.073 0.257 
Alternate Entry Rate (ER
alt
) 0.214 0.193 0.118 0.143 0.066 0.070 0.268 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.171 0.169 0.112 0.156 0.052 0.062 0.120 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS)        
average 20.23 18.76 18.08 64.80 12.37 40.1 29.06 
median 0.085 0.254 0.327 1.418 0.250 0.320 0.442 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.143 0.050 0.056 0.033 0.050 0.039 0.124 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.134 0.039 0.039 0.028 0.045 0.029 0.052 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS)        
average 6.009 81.548 3.228 6.48 8.97 7.600 18.97 
median 0.526 0.156 0.054 0.133 0.182 0.121 0.195 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 9:  Entry Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Unadjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types)  
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.283 0.180 0.166 0.123 0.124 0.096 0.324 
NF 0.195 0.104 0.093 0.077 0.068 0.061 0.199 
DF 0.089 0.076 0.072 0.046 0.055 0.035 0.124 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.032 0.050 0.024 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.022 
NF 0.020 0.023 0.017 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.014 
DF 0.013 0.027 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.009 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (ERS) 0.118 0.198 0.134 0.083 0.074 0.081 0.115 
NF 0.083 0.228 0.131 0.138 0.093 0.100 0.129 
DF 0.371 0.165 0.124 0.028 0.079 0.033 0.133 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median) 
       
Total (ERS) 0.034 0.177 0.052 0.02 0.038 0.025 0.058 
NF 0.041 0.025 0.056 0.026 0.063 0.026 0.040 
DF 0.038 0.117 0.033 0.015 0.010 0.021 0.039 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer 
to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 10:  Entry Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Adjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.161 0.189 0.092 0.072 0.106 0.089 0.236 
NF 0.113 0.103 0.053 0.041 0.055 0.054 0.140 
DF 0.049 0.086 0.038 0.031 0.051 0.035 0.097 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.022 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.015 
NF 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.008 
DF 0.012 0.023 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.007 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average)        
Total (ERS) 0.120 0.155 0.093 0.102 0.079 0.085 0.106 
NF 0.073 0.187 0.126 0.183 0.105 0.110 0.131 
DF 0.389 0.122 0.051 0.023 0.078 0.033 0.116 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median)        
Total (ERS) 0.028 0.120 0.029 0.055 0.036 0.026 0.049 
NF 0.038 0.031 0.030 0.109 0.041 0.023 0.045 
DF 0.018 0.060 0.032 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.028 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to 
section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 11:  Entry Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Unadjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.339 0.309 0.204 0.259 0.153 0.193 0.486 
NF 0.025 0.052 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.044 
GE 0.314 0.257 0.191 0.242 0.141 0.179 0.441 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.097 0.185 0.138 0.320 0.155 0.271 0.194 
NF 0.006 0.047 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 
GE 0.092 0.138 0.136 0.319 0.155 0.271 0.185 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average)        
Total (ERS) 2.433 3.631 6.014 26.598 5.961 40.527 14.194 
NF 0.874 6.202 0.209 0.037 0.012 0.023 1.226 
GE 2.517 3.308 6.400 28.762 6.401 44.041 15.238 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median)        
Total (ERS) 0.013 0.347 0.134 1.907 0.443 2.677 0.920 
NF 0.004 0.706 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.122 
GE 0.013 0.304 0.147 2.530 0.585 3.629 1.201 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
54 
Table 12:  Entry Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Adjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.299 0.274 0.144 0.230 0.088 0.082 0.372 
NF 0.017 0.030 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.012 0.028 
GE 0.281 0.245 0.136 0.219 0.081 0.071 0.344 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.079 0.145 0.110 0.287 0.044 0.059 0.121 
NF 0.005 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
GE 0.074 0.126 0.108 0.287 0.044 0.058 0.116 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average)        
Total (ERS) 1.750 2.460 6.218 23.396 2.403 3.141 6.561 
NF 1.123 1.736 0.276 0.029 0.004 0.017 0.531 
GE 1.777 2.530 6.602 25.297 2.674 3.825 7.118 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median)        
Total (ERS) 0.013 0.321 0.184 2.271 0.074 0.041 0.484 
NF 0.004 0.540 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.096 
GE 0.013 0.296 0.208 2.873 0.129 0.157 0.613 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 13:  Entry Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Unadjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes and Broadband 
Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.189 0.214 0.146 0.190 0.132 0.154 0.342 
NF 0.015 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.022 
GE 0.132 0.153 0.097 0.140 0.102 0.110 0.245 
DF 0.042 0.047 0.042 0.037 0.021 0.034 0.074 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.203 0.204 0.170 0.192 0.122 0.144 0.173 
NF 0.013 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.012 
GE 0.154 0.143 0.109 0.145 0.095 0.104 0.125 
DF 0.037 0.032 0.050 0.039 0.021 0.032 0.035 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (ERS) 21.03 19.85 19.12 96.80 14.61 282.59 75.67 
NF 7.561 10.318 1.761 0.647 0.477 1.157 3.654 
GE 25.45 22.44 15.96 112.84 15.25 362.2 92.36 
DF 4.314 11.37 27.05 74.83 26.80 137.70 47.01 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median) 
       
Total (ERS) 0.090 0.251 0.376 0.624 0.332 2.043 0.619 
NF 0.003 0.090 0.038 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.024 
GE 0.073 0.242 0.327 0.669 0.439 2.228 0.663 
DF 0.236 0.239 0.680 1.284 0.241 2.204 0.814 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the 
data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 14:  Entry Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Adjusted Data, Averages over All ZIP Codes and Broadband 
Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Entry Rate        
Total (ER) 0.157 0.197 0.112 0.163 0.070 0.073 0.257 
NF 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.015 
GE 0.117 0.149 0.072 0.129 0.056 0.049 0.191 
DF 0.030 0.040 0.037 0.026 0.009 0.015 0.052 
        
Entrant Share         
Total (ESH) 0.171 0.169 0.112 0.156 0.052 0.062 0.120 
NF 0.008 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007 
GE 0.135 0.131 0.068 0.124 0.037 0.040 0.089 
DF 0.028 0.026 0.038 0.028 0.011 0.015 0.024 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(average)        
Total (ERS) 20.23 18.76 18.08 64.80 12.37 40.12 29.06 
NF 8.513 4.206 1.740 0.725 2.010 1.178 3.062 
GE 22.98 21.03 16.18 77.94 8.27 11.4 26.31 
DF 5.835 10.40 21.45 31.98 44.80 140.42 42.48 
        
Entrant Relative Size 
(median)        
Total (ERS) 0.085 0.254 0.327 1.418 0.250 0.320 0.442 
NF 0.003 0.097 0.032 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.024 
GE 0.063 0.227 0.278 1.330 0.293 0.436 0.438 
DF 0.223 0.289 0.680 4.394 0.352 0.458 1.066 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 15:  Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Unadjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.183 0.175 0.107 0.112 0.078 0.042 0.232 
EF 0.122 0.104 0.087 0.076 0.052 0.025 0.155 
CF 0.061 0.071 0.020 0.036 0.025 0.017 0.077 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.035 0.052 0.050 0.014 0.023 0.006 0.030 
EF 0.023 0.033 0.043 0.013 0.021 0.003 0.023 
CF 0.012 0.019 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 0.230 0.350 0.866 0.116 0.294 0.107 0.327 
EF 0.246 0.427 0.876 0.165 0.475 0.079 0.378 
CF 0.159 0.289 1.263 0.032 0.038 0.098 0.313 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.084 0.166 0.356 0.057 0.059 0.076 0.133 
EF 0.156 0.166 0.525 0.070 0.065 0.058 0.173 
CF 0.029 0.033 0.102 0.008 0.002 0.116 0.048 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer 
to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 16:  Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Adjusted Data, Averages over Broadband Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.170 0.058 0.052 0.069 0.053 0.033 0.145 
EF 0.105 0.040 0.036 0.044 0.040 0.021 0.095 
CF 0.065 0.019 0.016 0.026 0.013 0.012 0.050 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.028 0.030 0.040 0.009 0.020 0.005 0.022 
EF 0.016 0.019 0.037 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.017 
CF 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 0.194 0.454 1.240 0.140 0.453 0.112 0.432 
EF 0.207 0.596 1.292 0.197 0.770 0.084 0.524 
CF 0.173 0.199 1.174 0.042 0.050 0.099 0.290 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.038 0.216 0.407 0.081 0.050 0.063 0.143 
EF 0.044 0.157 0.555 0.099 0.055 0.071 0.164 
CF 0.024 0.034 0.037 0.019 0.002 0.032 0.025 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US-BB market has the 
geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to 
section II.B.5).   See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 17:  Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Unadjusted Data, Averages Over All ZIP Codes) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.117 0.096 0.071 0.099 0.135 0.038 0.185 
EF 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.037 
GC 0.089 0.059 0.044 0.092 0.129 0.032 0.148 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.079 0.046 0.049 0.098 0.245 0.016 0.089 
EF 0.033 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 
GC 0.046 0.043 0.040 0.098 0.244 0.016 0.081 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 7.997 3.666 3.006 3.817 24.863 1.089 7.406 
EF 27.923 0.097 0.924 0.135 0.048 0.019 4.858 
GC 2.044 5.587 4.128 4.085 25.858 1.283 7.164 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.065 0.013 0.013 0.250 1.867 0.005 0.369 
EF 0.165 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.032 
GC 0.052 0.021 0.027 0.307 2.292 0.005 0.451 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 18:  Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Method of Entry (Adjusted Data, Averages Over All ZIP Codes) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.100 0.045 0.046 0.026 0.033 0.026 0.092 
EF 0.012 0.017 0.025 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.021 
GC 0.088 0.028 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.022 0.071 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.043 0.018 0.026 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.018 
EF 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
GC 0.040 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.015 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 1.466 1.870 1.696 1.396 0.228 0.236 1.149 
EF 0.099 0.114 1.129 0.204 0.019 0.025 0.265 
GC 1.578 2.911 2.184 1.537 0.253 0.270 1.456 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.034 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.012 
EF 0.016 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.008 
GC 0.037 0.011 0.022 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.015 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The ZIP market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and groups all broadband types together.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 19:  Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Method of Exit (Unadjusted Data, Averages Over All ZIP Codes and Broadband 
Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.168 0.114 0.091 0.127 0.142 0.050 0.231 
EF 0.028 0.039 0.033 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.041 
GC 0.091 0.058 0.037 0.085 0.098 0.025 0.131 
CF 0.049 0.016 0.022 0.033 0.037 0.018 0.058 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.158 0.101 0.068 0.121 0.157 0.038 0.107 
EF 0.027 0.034 0.020 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.017 
GC 0.085 0.053 0.029 0.085 0.107 0.016 0.063 
CF 0.046 0.014 0.020 0.030 0.044 0.017 0.029 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 6.86 69.57 6.67 32.87 59.30 7.10 30.40 
EF 12.004 2.573 3.754 0.978 5.154 0.666 4.188 
GC 6.27 123.22 5.80 40.52 54.84 3.0 38.93 
CF 5.116 40.59 8.84 17.72 77.88 17.12 27.88 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.502 0.226 0.051 0.406 2.488 0.090 0.627 
EF 0.363 0.151 0.005 0.023 0.037 0.003 0.097 
GC 0.190 0.251 0.063 0.476 1.525 0.040 0.424 
CF 0.637 0.311 0.165 0.373 4.864 0.302 1.109 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.   Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the 
data (refer to section II.B.5).  See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 20:  Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Method of Exit (Adjusted Data, Averages Over All ZIP Codes and Broadband 
Types) 
 Dec. 2005 June 2006 Dec. 2006 June 2007 Dec. 2007 June 2008 
Average 
(annualized) 
Exit Rate        
Total (XR) 0.143 0.050 0.056 0.033 0.050 0.039 0.124 
EF 0.012 0.015 0.029 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.023 
GC 0.092 0.028 0.017 0.021 0.030 0.018 0.069 
CF 0.039 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.033 
        
Exiter Share         
Total (XSH) 0.134 0.039 0.039 0.028 0.045 0.029 0.052 
EF 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.008 
GC 0.086 0.023 0.013 0.017 0.024 0.011 0.029 
CF 0.036 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.018 0.015 0.015 
        
Exiter Relative Size 
(average) 
       
Total (XRS) 6.01 81.55 3.23 6.48 8.97 7.60 18.97 
EF 3.057 1.218 3.112 0.758 5.491 1.155 2.465 
GC 5.99 148.72 2.94 8.39 2.31 2.0 28.40 
CF 5.722 31.66 2.23 3.28 29.74 17.84 15.08 
        
Exiter Relative Size (median)        
Total (XRS) 0.526 0.156 0.054 0.133 0.182 0.121 0.195 
EF 0.781 0.058 0.006 0.052 0.038 0.024 0.160 
GC 0.322 0.194 0.084 0.112 0.134 0.040 0.148 
CF 0.617 0.218 0.206 0.342 1.922 0.332 0.606 
Table notes:  Figures are averages unless otherwise noted.  The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column.  The ZIP-BB market has the 
geographic extent of a single ZIP code area and differentiates among broadband types.   Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data 
(refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.3 and II.B.4 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 21:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Unadjusted Data, Distribution across 
Years) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.069, 0.059 0.002, 0.001 0.021, 0.020 
 (0.05,0.08) (0.00,0.00) (0.02,0.03) 
BPL 0.219, 0.200 0.009, 0.000 0.029, 0.020 
 (0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.06) 
Cable modem 0.114, 0.106 0.012, 0.002 0.076, 0.022 
 (0.09,0.15) (0.00,0.01) (0.01,0.08) 
Fiber 0.212, 0.204 0.016, 0.013 0.076, 0.070 
 (0.19,0.24) (0.01,0.02) (0.03,0.09) 
Satellite 0.000, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 NA 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) NA 
SDSL 0.111, 0.108 0.016, 0.010 0.123, 0.069 
 (0.08,0.15) (0.00,0.02) (0.05,0.23) 
Fixed wireless 0.194, 0.176 0.093, 0.089 0.421, 0.379 
 (0.13,0.28) (0.04,0.13) (0.30,0.62) 
Mobile wireless 0.376, 0.323 0.029, 0.001 0.032, 0.005 
 (0.22,0.53) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds, and are not annualized.  The second and fifth 
order statistics are given in parentheses; these compose the first-to-ninth decile range for the six observations per broadband type.  ERS is undefined for 
satellite firms because there is no entry at the national level.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). 
See section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics.   
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Table 22:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Adjusted Data, Distribution across Years) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.052, 0.045 0.001, 0.001 0.022, 0.021 
 (0.03,0.11) (0.00,0.00) (0.02,0.03) 
BPL 0.131, 0.100 0.003, 0.000 0.021, 0.022 
 (0.00,0.33) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.04) 
Cable modem 0.089, 0.088 0.004, 0.001 0.035, 0.019 
 (0.06,0.12) (0.00,0.01) (0.01,0.12) 
Fiber 0.179, 0.159 0.014, 0.011 0.085, 0.068 
 (0.15,0.25) (0.00,0.04) (0.01,0.23) 
Satellite 0.000, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 NA 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) NA 
SDSL 0.078, 0.078 0.007, 0.004 0.083, 0.046 
 (0.04,0.11) (0.00,0.02) (0.02,0.30) 
Fixed wireless 0.130, 0.117 0.061, 0.050 0.415, 0.407 
 (0.07,0.20) (0.02,0.14) (0.19,0.68) 
Mobile wireless 0.287, 0.243 0.029, 0.001 0.045, 0.005 
 (0.05,0.75) (0.00,0.16) (0.00,0.24) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds, and are not annualized.  The second and fifth 
order statistics are given in parentheses; these compose the first-to-ninth decile range for the six observations per broadband type.  ERS is undefined for 
satellite firms because there is no entry at the national level.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See 
section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics.   
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Table 23:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Unadjusted Data, Distribution across ZIP 
Codes and Years) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.137, 0.000 0.049, 0.000 36.053, 0.003 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.57) 
BPL 0.000, 0.000 0.183, 0.000 .,     . 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,1.00) (   .,   .) 
Cable modem 0.033, 0.000 0.057, 0.000 18.379, 0.131 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,11.63) 
Fiber 0.209, 0.000 0.268, 0.000 24.679, 0.548 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.02,19.40) 
Satellite 0.125, 0.000 0.052, 0.000 0.621, 0.266 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.13) (0.05,0.86) 
SDSL 0.128, 0.000 0.150, 0.000 29.351, 0.361 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,1.00) (0.02,4.93) 
Fixed wireless 0.105, 0.000 0.209, 0.000 10.670, 0.678 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,1.00) (0.03,18.79) 
Mobile wireless 0.386, 0.000 0.365, 0.000 176.771, 4.030 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.10,34.34) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the data, and are 
not annualized. The first-to-ninth decile range is given in parentheses.  ERS is undefined for BPL firms because there is only ever a single firm providing BPL 
service at a time, and so there are never any incumbents upon entry.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section 
II.B.5). See section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics.   
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Table 24:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Adjusted Data, Distribution across ZIP 
Codes and Years) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.106, 0.000 0.039, 0.000 42.199, 0.003 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.62) 
BPL 0.000, 0.000 0.135, 0.000 NA 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,1.00) NA 
Cable modem 0.021, 0.000 0.029, 0.000 18.477, 0.090 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,10.92) 
Fiber 0.150, 0.000 0.182, 0.000 23.414, 0.515 
 (0.00,0.67) (0.00,1.00) (0.02,33.78) 
Satellite 0.117, 0.000 0.046, 0.000 0.583, 0.266 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.11) (0.05,0.84) 
SDSL 0.080, 0.000 0.094, 0.000 41.359, 0.375 
 (0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.31) (0.01,5.76) 
Fixed wireless 0.069, 0.000 0.144, 0.000 11.556, 0.744 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.03,18.27) 
Mobile wireless 0.271, 0.000 0.251, 0.000 43.351, 2.043 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.07,23.17) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the data, and are 
not annualized. ERS is undefined for BPL firms because there is only ever a single firm providing BPL service at a time, and so there are never any incumbents 
upon entry. Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5).   See section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 25:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Unadjusted Data, Distribution across 
Years) 
 
Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.049, 0.050 0.030, 0.003 0.709, 0.046 
 (0.05,0.05) (0.00,0.00) (0.04,0.08) 
BPL 0.067, 0.000 0.007, 0.000 0.084, 0.084 
 (0.00,0.20) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.17) 
Cable modem 0.075, 0.074 0.021, 0.009 0.267, 0.095 
 (0.06,0.10) (0.00,0.04) (0.06,0.33) 
Fiber 0.083, 0.079 0.023, 0.008 0.203, 0.082 
 (0.06,0.11) (0.00,0.01) (0.03,0.11) 
Satellite 0.056, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 0.001, 0.001 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) 
SDSL 0.135, 0.141 0.078, 0.084 0.557, 0.504 
 (0.10,0.16) (0.04,0.12) (0.21,0.74) 
Fixed wireless 0.165, 0.167 0.080, 0.083 0.423, 0.457 
 (0.11,0.20) (0.05,0.11) (0.35,0.51) 
Mobile wireless 0.300, 0.307 0.000, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 
 (0.16,0.50) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds, and are not annualized. The first-to-ninth 
decile range is given in parentheses.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for 
definitions of statistics.  
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Table 26:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the US-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Adjusted Data, Distribution across Years) 
 
Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.032, 0.029 0.030, 0.002 0.852, 0.062 
 (0.03,0.04) (0.00,0.17) (0.04,4.82) 
BPL 0.000, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 .,     . 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (   .,   .) 
Cable modem 0.050, 0.050 0.013, 0.003 0.331, 0.070 
 (0.04,0.07) (0.00,0.07) (0.01,1.74) 
Fiber 0.050, 0.042 0.020, 0.002 0.303, 0.057 
 (0.03,0.09) (0.00,0.10) (0.03,1.52) 
Satellite 0.056, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 0.001, 0.001 
 (0.00,0.33) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) 
SDSL 0.103, 0.103 0.067, 0.066 0.713, 0.558 
 (0.06,0.16) (0.02,0.12) (0.15,2.11) 
Fixed wireless 0.103, 0.090 0.046, 0.040 0.408, 0.439 
 (0.07,0.17) (0.02,0.09) (0.21,0.50) 
Mobile wireless 0.187, 0.138 0.000, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds, and are not annualized. The first-to-ninth 
decile range is given in parentheses.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for 
definitions of statistics.  
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Table 27:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Unadjusted Data, Distribution across ZIP 
Codes and Years) 
 
Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.066, 0.000 0.030, 0.000 52.268, 0.003 
 (0.00,0.29) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.45) 
BPL 0.096, 0.000 0.096, 0.000 NA 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) NA 
Cable modem 0.059, 0.000 0.055, 0.000 14.417, 0.279 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,8.36) 
Fiber 0.260, 0.000 0.256, 0.000 12.978, 0.821 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.03,12.06) 
Satellite 0.034, 0.000 0.020, 0.000 0.800, 0.071 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.03,0.76) 
SDSL 0.235, 0.000 0.207, 0.000 4.755, 0.400 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.03,3.54) 
Fixed wireless 0.172, 0.000 0.167, 0.000 6.559, 0.499 
 (0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00) (0.02,11.11) 
Mobile wireless 0.152, 0.000 0.187, 0.000 92.382, 8.582 
 (0.00,0.67) (0.00,1.00) (0.32,78.14) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the data, and are 
not annualized. The first-to-ninth decile range is given in parentheses.  XRS is undefined for BPL firms because there is only ever a single firm providing BPL 
service at a time, and so there are never any remaining incumbents upon exit.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer 
to section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for definitions of statistics.  
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Table 28:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the ZIP-BB Broadband Market by Broadband Types (Adjusted Data, Distribution across ZIP 
Codes and Years) 
 Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean, Median 
(1
st
 decile, 9
th
 decile) 
ADSL 0.040, 0.000 0.018, 0.000 60.582, 0.004 
 (0.00,0.13) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.51) 
BPL 0.030, 0.000 0.030, 0.000 NA 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) NA 
Cable modem 0.026, 0.000 0.024, 0.000 6.671, 0.295 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.02,11.16) 
Fiber 0.150, 0.000 0.148, 0.000 8.423, 0.716 
 (0.00,0.67) (0.00,0.97) (0.04,10.68) 
Satellite 0.026, 0.000 0.014, 0.000 0.717, 0.067 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.03,0.55) 
SDSL 0.165, 0.000 0.141, 0.000 3.478, 0.377 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.83) (0.03,2.42) 
Fixed wireless 0.090, 0.000 0.085, 0.000 5.234, 0.439 
 (0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.10) (0.02,7.53) 
Mobile wireless 0.045, 0.000 0.047, 0.000 22.529, 6.865 
 (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.01,39.86) 
Table notes:  means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the data, and are 
not annualized. The first-to-ninth decile range is given in parentheses.  XRS is undefined for BPL firms because there is only ever a single firm providing BPL 
service at a time, and so there are never any remaining incumbents upon exit.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to 
section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for definitions of statistics.  
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Table 29:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Census Region (Unadjusted Data) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean 
New England 0.227 0.084 3.207 
Middle Atlantic 0.225 0.098 10.425 
East North Central 0.214 0.171 17.282 
West North Central 0.305 0.251 16.101 
South Atlantic 0.218 0.154 5.596 
East South Central 0.294 0.204 13.687 
West South Central 0.251 0.143 4.35 
Mountain 0.261 0.226 55.882 
Pacific Contiguous 0.198 0.154 14.148 
Table notes:  means are calculated for each Census region, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the region, and are not annualized.  
Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics.  New England 
states are CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT; Middle Atlantic states are NJ, NY, PA; East North Central states are IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; West North Central states are IA, KS, 
MN, MO, ND, NE, ND, SD; South Atlantic states are DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; East South Central states are AL, KY, MS, TN; West South Central states 
are AR, LA, OK, TX; Mountain states are AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM,NV, UT, WY; Pacific Contiguous states are CA, OR, WA. 
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Table 30:  The Distribution of Entry Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Census Region (Adjusted Data) 
 
Entry Rate  
(ER) 
Mean 
Entrant Share  
(ESH) 
Mean 
Entrant Relative  
Size (ERS) 
Mean 
New England 0.190 0.061 2.589 
Middle Atlantic 0.181 0.063 7.906 
East North Central 0.156 0.097 9.579 
West North Central 0.236 0.163 12.533 
South Atlantic 0.166 0.092 3.195 
East South Central 0.212 0.108 5.338 
West South Central 0.192 0.101 3.784 
Mountain 0.208 0.146 10.715 
Pacific Contiguous 0.146 0.089 9.019 
Table notes:  means are calculated for each Census region, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the region, and are not 
annualized.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.2 for definitions of statistics. New 
England states are CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT; Middle Atlantic states are NJ, NY, PA; East North Central states are IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; West North Central states are 
IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, ND, SD; South Atlantic states are DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; East South Central states are AL, KY, MS, TN; West South Central 
cstates are AR, LA, OK, TX; Mountain states are AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM,NV, UT, WY; Pacific Contiguous states are CA, OR, WA.  
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Table 31:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Census Region (Unadjusted Data) 
 Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean 
New England 0.091 0.037 2.749 
Middle Atlantic 0.102 0.053 6.915 
East North Central 0.091 0.101 12.407 
West North Central 0.089 0.122 17.749 
South Atlantic 0.085 0.084 4.978 
East South Central 0.112 0.127 10.285 
West South Central 0.093 0.07 2.646 
Mountain 0.082 0.108 12.93 
Pacific Contiguous 0.097 0.087 11.804 
Table notes:  means are calculated for each Census region, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the region, and are not 
annualized.   Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. New 
England states are CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT; Middle Atlantic states are NJ, NY, PA; East North Central states are IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; West North Central states are 
IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, ND, SD; South Atlantic states are DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; East South Central states are AL, KY, MS, TN; West South Central 
states are AR, LA, OK, TX; Mountain states are AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM,NV, UT, WY; Pacific Contiguous states are CA, OR, WA. 
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Table 32:  The Distribution of Exit Statistics for the ZIP Broadband Market by Census Region (Adjusted Data) 
 Exit Rate  
(XR) 
Mean 
Exiter Share  
(XSH) 
Mean 
Exiter Relative  
Size (XRS) 
Mean 
New England 0.060 0.014 1.253 
Middle Atlantic 0.069 0.018 1.630 
East North Central 0.044 0.016 0.757 
West North Central 0.035 0.016 1.342 
South Atlantic 0.042 0.022 1.415 
East South Central 0.042 0.018 1.496 
West South Central 0.041 0.021 1.253 
Mountain 0.037 0.015 0.786 
Pacific Contiguous 0.053 0.016 0.755 
Table notes:  means are calculated for each Census region, across the six semi-annual rounds and across all the ZIP codes in the region, and are not 
annualized.   Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See section II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. New 
England states are CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT; Middle Atlantic states are NJ, NY, PA; East North Central states are IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; West North Central states are 
IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, ND, SD; South Atlantic states are DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; East South Central states are AL, KY, MS, TN; West South Central 
states are AR, LA, OK, TX; Mountain states are AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM,NV, UT, WY; Pacific Contiguous states are CA, OR, WA.  
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Table 33:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Unadjusted Data, US-BB Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.713** 0.464** 0.788** 0.814** 0.427 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.480** 0.653** 0.639** 0.718** 0.934** 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.730** 0.625** 0.692** 0.894** 0.993** 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.589** 0.485** 0.716** 0.357 -0.229 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.373* 0.294 0.625** 0.623** 0.959** 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) -0.104 -0.121 0.069 0.413 0.849* 
*
Significant at the 5% level.   
**
Significant at the 1% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Significance refers 
to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation.  The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second 
autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.  Single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See 
sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 34:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Adjusted Data, US-BB Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.290 0.272 0.543** 0.770** 0.321 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.246 0.605** 0.423* 0.553* 0.974** 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.677** 0.678** 0.672** 0.863** 0.995** 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.393* 0.254 0.675** 0.688** -0.256 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.153 0.105 0.392 0.694** 0.965** 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) -0.136 -0.147 -0.014 0.271 0.923* 
*
Significant at the 5% level.   
**
Significant at the 1% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Significance refers 
to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation.  The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second 
autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.  Single-round entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See 
sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 35:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Unadjusted Data, ZIP Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) -0.034 0.095 0.035 0.009* 0.033 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.194 0.343 0.159 0.093 0.197 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.019 0.104 0.005
†
 0.065 0.014
†
 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.020 -0.025 0.039 0.078 0.017 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.086 0.030 0.076 0.139 0.045 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.127 0.081 0.018* 0.007
†
 0.049 
*
Significant at the 5% level. 
†
Not significant at the 10% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all autocorrelations are statistically significant at the 1% level (where significance refers to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation).  
The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation. Single-round 
entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 36:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Adjusted Data, ZIP Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) -0.007 -0.019 0.002
†
 -0.012 0.067 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.025 0.006* 0.027 -0.089 0.117 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) -0.005
†
 -0.009 0.128 0.003
†
 -0.010
†
 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.052 0.006
†
 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.007 0.003
†
 0.015 -0.003
†
 0.008
†
 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.003
†
 0.003
†
 0.014
†
 0.036 0.019
†
 
*
Significant at the 10% level.  
†
Not significant at the 10% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all autocorrelations are statistically significant at the 1% level (where significance refers to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation).  
The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.  Single-round 
entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 37:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Unadjusted Data, ZIP-BB Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) 0.003* 0.092 0.036 0.045 -0.021 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.199 0.291 0.160 0.198 0.177 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) 0.041 0.071 0.038 0.011
†
 0.002
†
 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.133 0.079 0.125 0.204 0.002
†
 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.141 0.068 0.127 0.244 0.011 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) 0.788 0.474 0.158 0.031* 0.005
†
 
†
Not significant at the 10% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all autocorrelations are statistically significant at the 1% level (where significance refers to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation).  
The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.  Single-round 
entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 38:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures across Time (Adjusted Data, ZIP-BB Market)  
Measure xt Cor(xt ,xt-1) Cor(xt ,xt-2) Cor(xt ,xt-3) Cor(xt ,xt-4) Cor(xt ,xt-5) 
Entry Rate (ER) -0.041 -0.041 -0.002
†
 -0.017 0.008 
Entrant Share (ESH) 0.088 0.116 0.080 -0.002
†
 0.118 
Entrant Relative Size (ERS) -0.005
†
 -0.002
†
 0.058 0.084 -0.015
†
 
Exit Rate (XR) 0.030 0.040 0.029 0.053 0.001
†
 
Exiter Share (XSH) 0.029 0.037 0.044 0.055 0.006 
Exiter Relative Size (XRS) -0.003
†
 -0.002
†
 -0.006
†
 0.072 0.002
†
 
†
Not significant at the 5% level. 
Table notes:  a cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all autocorrelations are statistically significant at the 1% level (where significance refers to treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation).  
The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.  Single-round 
entrants and exiters have been removed from the data (refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
81 
Table 39:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures (US-BB Market)  
  Unadjusted Data  Adjusted Data 
  
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
         
  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt) 
Exit Rate         
XRt-4  0.455  -0.463  0.256  -0.106 
XRt-3  0.290  -0.423  0.167  -0.243 
XRt-2  0.612  0.149  0.170  -0.221 
XRt-1  0.655  0.308  0.669  0.632 
XRt  0.470  0.191  0.170  -0.104 
XRt+1  0.720  0.598  0.153  -0.219 
XRt+2  0.690  0.502  0.591  0.486 
XRt+3  0.578  0.223  0.530  0.386 
XRt+4  0.293  -0.310  -0.114  -0.736 
         
  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt) 
Exiter Share         
XSHt-4  0.557  -0.400  0.414  -0.179 
XSHt-3  0.572  -0.017  0.317  0.091 
XSHt-2  0.573  0.134  0.390  0.172 
XSHt-1  0.326  0.104  0.047  -0.022 
XSHt  0.387  0.207  0.197  0.151 
XSHt+1  0.390  0.241  0.090  0.052 
XSHt+2  0.321  0.140  0.041  -0.002 
XSHt+3  0.337  -0.098  0.169  0.073 
XSHt+4  0.160  -0.053  0.062  0.081 
Table notes:  each entry is the correlation between the exit variable in the row heading with the entry variable in the column subheading.   For columns 
labeled Unadjusted Data, single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data, while for columns labeled Adjusted Data, they have been 
(refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 40:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures (ZIP Market)  
  Unadjusted Data  Adjusted Data 
  
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
         
  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt) 
Exit Rate         
XRt-4  -0.023  -0.111  0.005  -0.015 
XRt-3  0.064  -0.024  0.115  0.099 
XRt-2  0.070  -0.031  0.081  0.067 
XRt-1  0.282  0.207  0.106  0.111 
XRt  0.006  -0.09  0.027  0.029 
XRt+1  0.189  0.13  -0.060  -0.066 
XRt+2  0.056  -0.039  0.026  0.028 
XRt+3  0.055  -0.021  -0.001  0.025 
XRt+4  0.007  -0.045  0.010  0.064 
         
  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt) 
Exiter Share         
XSHt-4  0.087  -0.231  0.013  -0.100 
XSHt-3  0.138  -0.179  0.146  0.095 
XSHt-2  0.147  -0.139  0.087  0.025 
XSHt-1  0.506  0.337  0.125  0.076 
XSHt  0.224  -0.014  0.103  0.056 
XSHt+1  0.453  0.327  -0.055  -0.138 
XSHt+2  0.096  -0.132  0.012  -0.047 
XSHt+3  0.171  -0.01  0.007  -0.030 
XSHt+4  0.052  -0.216  0.008  -0.019 
Table notes:  each entry is the correlation between the exit variable in the row heading with the entry variable in the column subheading.     For columns 
labeled Unadjusted Data, single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data, while for columns labeled Adjusted Data, they have been 
(refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
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Table 41:  Correlations between Market Entry and Exit Measures (ZIP-BB Market)  
  Unadjusted Data  Adjusted Data 
  
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
No Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
 
With Correction for  
Market Fixed Effects 
         
  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt)  Entry Rate (ERt) 
Exit Rate         
XRt-4  0.074  -0.062  0.046  -0.057 
XRt-3  0.082  -0.038  0.159  0.098 
XRt-2  0.115  -0.020  0.116  0.071 
XRt-1  0.323  0.159  0.061  0.039 
XRt  0.051  -0.048  0.013  0.003 
XRt+1  0.137  0.031  -0.053  -0.080 
XRt+2  0.063  -0.025  0.060  0.042 
XRt+3  0.036  0.000  -0.007  -0.015 
XRt+4  0.021  -0.040  0.036  0.034 
         
  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt)  Entrant Share (ESHt) 
Exiter Share         
XSHt-4  0.100  -0.315  0.046  -0.269 
XSHt-3  0.215  -0.117  0.319  0.122 
XSHt-2  0.211  -0.130  0.224  0.072 
XSHt-1  0.630  0.409  0.361  0.278 
XSHt  0.411  0.240  0.267  0.272 
XSHt+1  0.244  -0.094  -0.084  -0.238 
XSHt+2  0.137  -0.180  0.076  -0.07 
XSHt+3  0.198  0.006  0.014  -0.07 
XSHt+4  0.130  -0.069  0.095  0.057 
Table notes:  each entry is the correlation between the exit variable in the row heading with the entry variable in the column subheading.   For columns 
labeled Unadjusted Data, single-round entrants and exiters have not been removed from the data, while for columns labeled Adjusted Data, they have been 
(refer to section II.B.5). See sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 for definitions of statistics. 
